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EXCUS E AN D M ITIGATION U N D E R 
I NTE R NATIONAL CR I M I NAL LAW: 
R E D RAWI NG CONCE PTUAL BOU N DAR I E S 
Olaoluwa Olusanya*
Since the Nuremberg trials of 1945, the classification of men and women who
commit atrocities in time of war has been a subject of bafflement. Attempts to
explain this phenomenon have largely relied on various abnormality theories.
However, none of these theories hold sway. Instead, the dominant view today
is that men and women who commit atrocities are normal. This conclusion
has confounded many because it is even harder to rationalize how people who
in fact closely resemble us could perpetrate such violent crimes. How had they
become evil criminals? The focus on this article is on excuse theory and its
value in resolving this issue.
“There is no evidence in the case, we submit, that prior to the war this de-
fendant ever showed a single racist attitude, said anything with a racist con-
notation, did anything to anybody which had a racist connotation to it.
You may think that he was, in fact, entirely lacking in such thoughts. It is
at that point that the Prosecution have a difﬁculty because they have not
even begun to try and explain how it is that suddenly, for a period of per-
haps only 18 days, in May 24 1992, Goran Jelisic suddenly changed and be-
came a blood-thirsty killer, glorying in his trade, and then suddenly, when
he ceases to be occupied in that business, he reverts to having his Muslim
friends whom he helps, in some cases, by ferrying them across the river at
considerable personal risk to himself. They have not explained that. They
have not demonstrated any reason why that should be so.’’1
New Criminal Law Review, Vol. 13, Number 1, pps 23–89. ISSN 1933-4192, electronic
ISSN 1933-4206. © 2010 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights re-
served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content
through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, http://www.
ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2010.13.1.23.
*Department of Law and Criminology, Hugh Owen Building, Aberystwyth University,
Ceredigion SY23 3DY, United Kingdom; ooo@abcer.ac.uk.
1. Statement made by Mr. Michael Greaves, Co-Counsel on behalf of Goran Jelisic,
see trial transcript in the proceedings in Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T,
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I NTROD UCTION
Since the Nuremberg trials of 1945, the classiﬁcation of men and women who
commit atrocities in time of war has been a subject of bafﬂement.2
Criminologists,3 sociologist,4 and psychologists5 have devoted their efforts to
making sense of how individuals can arrive at the point of cruelly perpetrat-
ing atrocities against erstwhile neighbors and friends. Various abnormality
theories have been advanced.6 One theory is that perpetrators of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity have a peculiar personality trait.7
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  13 | NO.  1 | WI NTE R 201024
paras. 3141–3142, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/jelisic/trans/en/991125it.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). See
also Thomas Blass, Obedience to Authority, 206 (2000) (“Human nature can be trans-
formed within certain powerful social settings in ways as dramatic as the chemical trans-
formation in the captivating fable of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.”).
2. See, e.g., Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13
Eur. J. Int’l L. 571 (2002) (“What kind of a person is likely to get involved in a serious,
large-scale crime, such as those listed in the ICC Statute? How is it possible to explain ‘die
relative Leichtigkeit, mit der das Regime—und auch die Regime vor und nach der NS-
Zeit—ihre Henker fanden und ﬁnden’?”). 
3. Most notably, Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority (1963).
4. See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (1989); Thomas Carnahan &
Sam McFarland, Revisiting the Stanford Prison Experiment, 33 Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull.
603–15 (2007) (revisiting Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison Experiment). On the dynam-
ics of collective violence, see Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police
Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (1993).
5. See Gerald L. Borofsky & Don J. Brand, Personality Organisation and Psychological
Functioning of the Nuremberg War Criminals, in Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators:
Essays on the Nazi Holocaust (Joel E. Dimsdale ed., 1980). 
6. See W. Charny Israel, Genocide and Mass Destruction: Doing Harm to Others as a
Missing Dimension in Psychopathology, 49 Psychiatry 144–57, at 144 & 146 (1986)
(“According to accepted psychiatric deﬁnitions, it was largely normal people—both leaders
and followers—who executed the most systematic evil in the history of mankind. . . . Yet it
is inconceivable that we reconcile ourselves to mental health concepts that do not deﬁne, in
some intelligent way, the leaders and followers who execute mass murder as disturbed and ab-
normal. . . . If making other people’s lives miserable—persecuting, tormenting, and even
killing them—cannot be linked with existing deﬁnitions of abnormality, the profession of
psychology has a serious problem of credibility.”). 
7. The following authors have argued that the Holocaust was caused by the propensity of
Germans to idolize authority and their personality predispositions toward an authoritarian
personality: Theodor W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (1950); Norbert Elias,
The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (1996); Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness (1997). 
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A second theory is that people who commit such crimes are driven by in-
tense hate or prejudice,8 whilst a third theory is that perpetrators of inter-
national crimes are mentally insane.9 However, none of these theories
holds sway. Instead, the dominant view today is that men and women who
commit atrocities are normal.10 For example, Kelley, the psychologist to the
Nuremberg Trial during the initial few months of its establishment, con-
cluded “not only that such personalities are not unique or insane but
also that they could be duplicated in any country of the world today.”11
This conclusion has confounded many because it is even harder to ra-
tionalize how people who in fact closely resemble us could perpetrate
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8. See Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust (1996) (Goldhagen’s controversial study emphasized free will in the form of
“eliminationist anti-Semitism” over compatibilism, that is, the theory that an individual’s
choices are the result of his or her own desires and preferences, and are not overridden by
some external or internal force.) For a compatiblist perspective, see Z. Bauman, supra note 4,
at 19 (arguing that complicity in the holocaust was not a product of an evil predisposition
but of state coercion and manipulation). Goldhagen’s thesis has since been discredited by
many. See, e.g., Fritz Stern, The Goldhagen Controversy, Foreign Aff. 128–38 (Nov./Dec.
1996); Reinhard Rürup, Viel Lärm über Nichts? D. J. Goldhagens “Radikale Revision” der
Holocaustforschung, 3 Neue Politische Literatur, 357–63 (1996); Ruth Bettina Birn,
Revising the Holocaust, 40 Hist. J. 195–215 (1997) (accusing the author of selectively using
primary sources); Dieter Pohl, Die Holocaustforschung and Goldhagens Thesen, 45
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1–48 (Jan. 1997). 
9. See Thomas Blass, Psychological Perspectives on the Perpetrators of the Holocaust:
The Role of Situational Pressures, Personal Dispositions, and Their Interactions, 7(1)
Holocaust & Genocide Stud. 30–50, 38 (Spring 1993) (“While the major Nazi leaders were
awaiting trial at the International Tribunal in Nuremberg in 1945, the prison psychologist,
Gustave Gilbert, a German-speaking American, administered the Rorschach ink-blot test
to them. Together with Miale, Selzer analyzed those Rorschach protocols and concluded
that . . . ‘the Nazis were not psychologically normal or healthy individuals’.” However,
Blass goes on to point out weaknesses in Gilbert and Selzer’s conclusion.).
10. See George M. Kren & Leon Rappoport, The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human
Behavior, 70 (1980) (“Our judgment is that the overwhelming majority of SS men, leaders
as well as rank and ﬁle, would have easily passed all the psychiatric tests ordinarily given to
US recruits or Kansas City policemen.”); see Z. Bauman, supra note 4, at 19 (agreeing with
Kren and Leon Rappoport). Similar conclusions have been drawn in relation to the per-
petrators of the My-Lai massacre by the U.S. Army’s Commission of Inquiry. According
to the Commission, the soldiers at My-Lai were “generally representative of American
youth assigned to combat units throughout the Army.” See Donald G. Dutton, The
Psychology of Genocide, Massacres and Extreme Violence, 135 (2007).
11. See Douglas M. Kelley, Preliminary Studies of the Rorschach Records of the Nazi
War Criminals, 10 Rorschach Exchange 45–48, 47 (1946). 
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such violent crimes.12 In this respect, Sonnenfeldt, a former Chief
Interpreter and Interrogator for the American Prosecutor at the Nuremberg
trials, wrote: “The indicted had no blood on their hands, no evil stares, no
murderous animal fangs, no signs of insanity. The apparent normality of
these men was very frightening; I wondered, would there ever be an-
other gang like them? Anywhere? Any time? How had they become
criminals?”13
The inability to answer these fundamental questions evidences the “limits
of the taxonomies used in our current analytical framework.”14 It is here that
excuse theory has value.15 From the point of view of excuse theory, the ﬁnd-
ings of the Nuremberg psychiatrist and psychologist that “such personalities
are not unique or insane, but also that they could be duplicated in any coun-
try of the world today” constitute a recognition of human weaknesses.16
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12. See Michael Mann, Were the Perpetrators of Genocide “Ordinary Men” or “Real
Nazis”?, 14(3) Holocaust & Genocide Stud. 331–66 (2001). See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann
in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 25 (1994) (“Half a dozen psychiatrists had
certiﬁed [E]ichmann as normal.”); Bernard J. Bergen, The Banality of Evil (1999); Tsvetan
Todorov, Facing the Extreme 124 (Arthur Denner & Abigail Pollak trans., 2000) (express-
ing incredulity that Eichmann, the man responsible for such evil acts, “stood before the
court a profoundly mediocre, indeed common, human being”).
13. See Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, Remarks, Symposium, The Nuremberg Trials: A
Reappraisal and Their Legacy, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1609, 1611 (2006). 
14. See O. Sara Liwerant, Mass Murder, 5(4) J. Int’l Crim. Just. 917–39, 928 (2007)
(“[T]he impossibility of deﬁning a new pathology of mass murder shows the limits of the
taxonomies used in our current analytical frameworks. The perplexity engendered by these
conclusions does not close the issue. On the contrary, this assessment, because it does not
ﬁt the usual taxonomies, catches a glimpse of ‘ordinary men’ that necessitates a new way
of framing the original issue. . . .”).
15. There is an abundance of research dealing with major rationales for the theory of ex-
cuse in criminal law. For a sample see the following authors: Glanville Williams, The
Theory of Excuses, Crim. L. Rev. 732 (1982); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and
Excuses, in Punishment and Responsibility, ch. 2 (1968); George P. Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law, 798–817 (1978); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in vol.
548 Placing Blame (1997) (“Excuses are the royal road to theories of responsibility generally.”);
George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 Yale L.J. 1661 (1987); Sanford
H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 257 (1987); Robert Sullivan, Making Excuses,
in Harm and Culpability, vol. 131 (Andrew Simester et al. eds., 1996); Paul H. Robinson,
Excuses, in Structure and Function in Criminal Law 81–94 (1997); Eugene R. Milhizer,
Justiﬁcation and Excuse: What They Were, What They Are, and What They Ought To Be,
78 Saint John’s L. Rev. 725, 864–54 (2004).
16. For example, excuses such as duress and provocation have been described as con-
cessions to human frailty. For provocation, see, e.g., John Gardner & Timothy Macklem,
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Thus the law recognizes that even though people may have ordinary levels
of courage, they may nevertheless be coerced into agreeing to break the
law. Similarly, the law accepts that despite the fact that people have ordi-
nary levels of self-control, there are situations where they may get angry
and lose their self-control.17 The recognition of human weaknesses has
led to the excuse theory playing a neutral role in the assessment of crim-
inal responsibility18 vis-à-vis all types of crimes regardless of their
EXCUSE AN D M IT IGATION | 27
Compassion Without Respect? Nine Fallacies, in R v. Smith, Crim. L. Rev. 623, 624 (2001)
(“[T]he whole idea of the defence of provocation was to make concessions to human
frailty.”); see also, e.g., Holmes v. DPP [1946] A.C. 588 (“The law has to reconcile respect
for the sanctity of human life with recognition of the effect of provocation on human
frailty.”); Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 959,
978–79 (2002) (“The provocation defense is about human imperfection and, more specif-
ically, impaired capacity for self control.” For duress, see, e.g., Regina v. Howe [1987] 1
A.C. 417 (H.L.) (Lord Hailsham stated vis-à-vis duress that “the ‘concession to human
frailty’ is no more than to say that in such circumstances a reasonable man of average
courage is entitled to embrace as a matter of choice the alternative which a reasonable man
could regard as the lesser of two evils.”).
17. Imagine, for instance, a scenario in which A, a soldier assigned to guarding prisoners
of war (POWs), learns that X, one of the POWs, was responsible for the murder and rape
of a relative of A’s. Boiling with anger, A kills X. Here we may say that owing to a per-
ceived sense of injustice perpetrated by agent X, A’s immediate response was to eliminate
the source of the wrong—in Hegelian terminology it was a disposition to annul or cancel
the wrong. See Georg W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, secs. 101–03 (Thomas M.
Knox, trans., 1967). (However, note that Hegel did not support private revenge, see id.,
secs. 102, 220.) “As Alcibiades argued in Timon of Athens and Revenge in A Fig for Fortune,
bearing is for asses. A Man who is truly a man cannot be patient. If he has ‘nature’ in him,
he will strike where wrong is offered,” see Eleanor Prosser, Hamlet and Revenge 158 (1971).
Raz refers to the above scenario as “expressive action”: “In the case of purely expressive ac-
tions we . . . allow the emotion to express itself, the will acting as a non interfering gate
keeper,” see Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action, 43–44
(1999); see also Willard Gaylin, Rage Within: Anger in Modern Life (1984) (pointing out
that human beings instinctively respond when we are hurt or insulted and that a state of
anger creates a high level of physiological arousal; it is deeply embedded in the human psy-
che, something inherited from primitive ancestors).
18. On the meaning of responsibility, see Hart’s taxonomy of ﬁve senses of moral re-
sponsibility: role, capacity, causal, legal, and liability responsibility. Of primary interest to
this article is capacity responsibility, under which an agent is presumed to possess the min-
imum requirements for normative competence and to be capable of fulﬁlling moral obli-
gations, and thus imposing responsibility on him or her would not be considered unfair.
See H.L.A. Hart, supra note 15, 211–30; John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Book 2, ch. 27, §§ 8, 15, 17–21, 23, 26 (1979, 1690) (explaining that only
persons can be held accountable in law and morality because only persons are responsible
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heinousness and magnitude.19 In cases concerning the excuse theory,20 the
critical issue is not the heinousness of the crime nor is it the role of the
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for their actions). For a philosophical discussion of capacity responsibility, see also John
Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral
Responsibility (1998). For a jurisprudential analysis of capacity responsibility, see Stephen
J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1587, 1587–1637 (1994). For a partial
critique of Hart’s treatise, see Peter Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality, (2002). On
the issue of at what point an agent can be deemed normatively competent, Kohlberg in his
study on cognitive development concluded that from thirteen years of age onward, an indi-
vidual is capable of fulﬁlling moral obligations. See Lawrence Kohlberg, Stage and Sequence:
The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, in Handbook of Socialization
Theory and Research 347 (David A. Goslin ed., 1969).
19. See Wayne R. Lafave & Austin W. Scott Jr., Criminal Law 212 (2nd ed. 1986) (“The
basic premise that for criminal liability some mens rea is required is expressed by the Latin
maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.”). The dictum dates to Edward Coke, The
Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning High Treason, and Other
Pleas of the Crown and Criminal Causes (1644), 107 (1797).
20. Cassese notes that international criminal law has yet to make any practical distinc-
tion between the concept of excuse and that of justiﬁcation. See Antonio Cassese,
Justiﬁcations and Excuses in International Criminal Law, in The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary 952–54 (Antonio Cassess et al. eds., 2002).
On the other hand, in the context of domestic criminal law, Fletcher is arguably most re-
sponsible for generating scholarly interest in the distinction between justiﬁcation and excuse,
and today his is the predominant view: “A justiﬁcation negates an assertion of wrongful
conduct. An excuse negates a charge that the particular defendant is personally to blame
for the wrongful conduct,” see George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 949, 958 (1985). This is consistent with the following distinction by Hart: “In the
case of ‘justiﬁcation’ what is done is regarded as something which the law does not con-
demn, or even welcomes”; in contrast, excuse defenses are triggered when “the psycholog-
ical state of the agent . . . exempliﬁed one or more of a variety of conditions which are held
to rule out the public condemnation and punishment of individuals,” see H.L.A. Hart,
supra note 15, 13–14. A number of other prominent scholars have commented on this dis-
tinction in a similar fashion, and there is substantial scholarship on this issue. See, e.g.:
Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 100–101 (1984) (“Justiﬁed conduct is correct be-
haviour that is encouraged or at least tolerated. In determining whether conduct is justi-
ﬁed, the focus is on the act, not the actor. An excuse represents a legal conclusion that the
conduct is wrong, undesirable, but that criminal liability is inappropriate because some
characteristic of the actor vitiates society’s desire to punish him. . . . The focus in excuses
is on the actor.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 318–19 (1996) (“[J]ustiﬁcations are said to iden-
tify acts that produce morally preferred states of affairs. . . . Excuses, in contrast, are said
to identify circumstances in which an act is wrongful but the actor blameless.”); Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justiﬁcation and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897
(1984) (“If A’s claim is that what he did was fully warranted . . . A offers a justiﬁcation; if
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victims21; instead it is whether, based on a unique set of facts, a reasonable
person would have responded in the same way as the accused.22 It follows
that, in principle, nothing prevents a fact ﬁnder from applying the excuse
theory in relation to war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity,23
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A acknowledges he acted wrongfully but claims he was not to blame . . . he offers an ex-
cuse.”); Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal
Law, 154 (1993) (“[A]s a justiﬁcation . . . no wrong act has been done. . . . As an excuse . . .
the focus moves from the question of the value of the act to the position, condition or cir-
cumstances of the actor and their effect on his culpability.”); M. Moore, supra note 15, 483,
(1997) (“[J]ustiﬁcations answer a different moral question than do excuses. . . . When an
action is justiﬁed, any prima facie wrongfulness is eliminated by the other (and good) at-
tributes of the action; when an action is excused, it is still wrongful but the actor cannot
be held responsible for it because she is not culpable.”).
21. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial Justiﬁcation or Partial Excuse?, 51
Mod. L. Rev. 467 (1988) (emphasizing in relation to provocation that the trend today is to
focus on the perpetrator’s self-control rather than the conduct of the decedent, and there-
fore to treat the defense as a form of excuse). 
22. See G. P. Fletcher, supra note 20, 955 (“Claims of justiﬁcation direct our attention
to the propriety of the act in the abstract; claims of excuse, to the blameworthiness of the
actor in the concrete situation.”). 
23. After all, as stated by John C. Smith, “to allow a defence to crime is not to express
approval of the action of the accused but only to declare that it does not merit condem-
nation and punishment,” see Justiﬁcation and Excuse in the Criminal Law, 13 (Hamlyn
Lectures, 1989). There has been a great deal of debate amongst philosophers on the notion
of an absolute moral prohibition of intentional homicide of innocent noncombatants. See,
e.g., Thomas Nagel, War and Massacre, 1(2) Phil. & Pub. Aff. 123–44 (1972) (Maintaining
as absolute the moral prohibition of intentional homicide of innocent noncombatants, he
contends that there are strong consequentialist reasons for “adhering to any limitation
which seems natural to most people—particularly if the limitation is widely accepted al-
ready. An exceptional measure which seems to be justiﬁed by its results in a particular con-
ﬂict may create a precedent with disastrous long-term effects.” (ibid., 125)); Richard
Brandt, Utilitarianism and the Rules of War, 1(2) Phil. & Pub. Aff. 145–65 (1972) (express-
ing a similar view as Nagel); Philip E. Divine, The Principle of Double Effect, 19 Am. J.
Juris. 44–60 (1975) (sharing the same opinion as Nagel and Brandt). It is difﬁcult to see
how the moral prohibition of intentional homicide against innocent persons can be made
absolute given the complexities of the legal ﬁeld. This would amount to an imbalance be-
tween offense and defense or between actus reus and mens rea—it would mean both the
annulment of all defenses and the imposition of strict liability offenses—effectively ensur-
ing a return to the Aristotelian approach (arête) at the expense of Kantian deontological
revolution. Thus the better view is that an absolute moral prohibition of intentional homicide
against innocent persons is untenable; see Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650 (1974), in The
My Lai Massacre and Its Cover-up: Beyond the Reach of Law?, 553 (Joseph Goldstein, Burke
Marshall, & Jack Schwartz eds., 1976) (in which Judge Robert Elliott, upon releasing Lt.
Calley on parole in 1974, is quoted as saying “war is war and it’s not unusual for innocent 
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since it offers a more principled perspective to the question of why people
who previously had no inclination toward violence would go on to perpe-
trate such violent crimes.24
However, the area of excuse and mitigation in the context of interna-
tional criminal law (ICL) remains in ﬂux.25 A catalogue of problems cur-
rently exists: there are no clear guidelines for presenting relevant evidence
to support either of these concepts26; there is no clear dichotomy between
excuse and mitigation—the line between mitigation and excuse is known
to mark the boundary of criminal responsibility. Yet, in the ICL context it
is difﬁcult to know where this boundary lies; owing to confusion and a lack
of a clear picture of how a person’s criminal responsibility may be affected
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civilians such as the My Lai victims to be killed. It has been so throughout recorded his-
tory”). From this perspective, the defense of excuse should be applicable to international
crimes regardless of their level of heinousness. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 203 (1982) (making the remark that an excused actor admits
harm or evil but claims absence of personal culpability); see also Cathryn Jo Rosen, The
Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women
Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev., 11, 22–23 (1986) (“[E]xcuses will apply only when the wrong-
ful conduct is substantially more attributable to coercive inﬂuences than to free will.
Because the act was not voluntary, commission of the wrongful act is not determinative of
the actor’s moral blameworthiness. Therefore, the excused actor cannot be punished solely
on the basis of performing the act.”).
24. As stated by Card, “[H]arm is not evil unless aggravated, supported, or produced
by culpable wrongdoing,” see Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm, 5 (2002). 
25. One explanation is that, prior to the establishment of contemporary international
criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, voluntary impairment defenses were
rarely asserted in war crimes prosecutions. Another explanation has been forwarded by
Esser: there are “certain psychological reservations towards defences. By providing perpe-
trators of brutal crimes against humanity . . . with defences for their offences, we have ef-
fectively lent them a hand in ﬁnding grounds for excluding punishability”; see Albin Esser,
Defences in War Crimes Trials, in War Crimes in International Law, 251 (Yoram Dinstein &
Tabory Mala eds., 1996); see also Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in The
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, 189, 208–209 (Roy S. Lee
ed., 1999) (maintaining that Article 31(2) of the ICC Statute gives the Court a residual
power to refuse to apply a defense to an individual case even where text of the statute might
require it).
26. For instance, although the Rules of Procedure of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia make reference to special defenses, aside from dimin-
ished responsibility, they do not mention what those special defenses are. See Peter Krug,
The Emerging Mental Incapacity Defence in International Criminal Law: Some Initial
Questions of Implementation, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 317, 319 (2000).
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by contextual determinants, judges have vacillated between guilt and in-
nocence, between exoneration and condemnation, and between heuris-
tics27 and normative reasoning. As a result the boundary of international
criminal responsibility is simultaneously expanding and contracting, and
thereby exposing ﬁssures in the ediﬁce of international criminal law. Thus
inconsistency and a lack of uniformity exist in the treatment of defendants
vis-à-vis excuse and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, in exercising
their discretion judges have narrowly focused on volition and reason28 at
the trial phase, thereby failing to take sufﬁcient account of relevant con-
textual processes in attributing blame.29 The employment of a bright lines
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27. See, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heurisics and Biases, 185, no. 4157 Science, 1124–31, 1124 (1974) (“Many decisions are based
on beliefs concerning the likelihood of uncertain events such as . . . the guilt of a defendant.
. . . What determines such beliefs? How do people assess the probability of an uncertain
event or the value of an uncertain quantity? This article shows that people rely on a limited
number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite use-
ful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.”); Keith E. Stanovich, The
Fundamental Computational Biases of Human Cognition, in The Psychology of Problem
Solving, 291–342 (Janet E. Davidson & Robert J. Sternberg eds., 2003).
28. Here we are able to contrast a Kantian approach with an Aristotelian approach.
Kant for instance stated that “[t]he will is not only the precondition for carrying out given
moral obligations; it is the origin of all concrete moral obligations which come into being
through the moral will.” In other words, moral choice or moral freedom is central to in-
dividual criminal responsibility. See Heiner Bielefeldt, Autonomy and Republicanism:
Immanuel Kant’s Philosophy of Freedom, 25 Pol. Theory, 528 (1997); see also Andrew
J. Ashworth, Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd
Series 1, (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). Aristotle, on the other hand, would have
stated that as long as a actor is sane then that actor is presumed to be fully capable despite
the hard choices he or she faces: “For example, a tyrant who had a man’s parents or chil-
dren in his power might order him to do something dishonourable on condition that, if
the man did it, their lives would be spared; otherwise not. . . . Now in the imaginary cases
we have stated the acts are voluntary. For the movement of the limbs instrumental to the
action originates in the agent himself, and when this is so it is in a man’s own power to act
or not to act. Such actions are therefore voluntary”; see Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics:
Book III, 78 (James Alexander Kerr Thomson trans., 1976).
29. Current research in the ﬁeld of social psychology evidences a shift from neo-
Aristotelian virtue ethics and the idea of a stable and ﬁrm character trait to the notion of
“fundamental attribution error”—in other words, the tendency to underestimate the in-
ﬂuence of external factors and overestimate the inﬂuence of internal factors. See, e.g.,
Gilbert Harman, Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology, 99 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y
315–31 (1999) (concluding that our ordinary attributions are “widely incorrect and, in fact,
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approach30 has arguably contributed to a distorted picture of international
criminal conduct as originating largely as the result of personal preference
and disposition instead being of the product of a combination of environ-
mental, personal, and other inﬂuences not always within individual control.31
Finally, the purpose of this paper goes far beyond clarifying the rela-
tionship between excuse and mitigation to encompass the invention of
tools by which to grade culpability in the ICL context as well as an in-
vestigation into the philosophical presumptions common to modern
legal systems: agency, moral responsibility, and culpability,32 in the ICL
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there is no evidence that people differ in their character traits” and that “despite appearances,
there is no empirical support for the existence of character traits”); see also John M. Doris,
Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics, 32:4 Nous 504–30 (1998) (arguing that a situationist
causal explanation of the agent’s behaviour is better than the explanation of trait theorists).
30. See Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2031, 2055–56 (1998) (“[T]he
perpetrator-driven nature of the rules of evidence, the requirements of substantive law, and
the respective roles, as traditionally conceived, of prosecutor, defence attorney, and judge,
suggest the need to draw bright lines that are often—perhaps usually—inconsistent with the
rendering of a nuanced history. . . . From the perspective of . . . judges, to emphasize . . .
the personal culpability of Milosevic or the impact of certain cultural or religious institu-
tions would be of questionable relevance to the narrow legal issues.”); see also Wayne R.
LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and
“Good Faith, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 307, 320–33 (1982) (pointing out the merits and demerits
of “bright-line” rules). Critical scholars have demonstrated that power arrangement is just
as signiﬁcant as rational choice in the attribution of criminal responsibility; see, e.g., Marion
Smiley, Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community, Power and Accountability
from a Pragmatic Point of View, (1993) (maintaining that the attribution of responsibility is
a reﬂection of political power); Elizabeth L. Hillman, Gentlemen Under Fire, 26 Law &
Ineq., 1, 3 (2008) (“[T]he perception that high-ranking ofﬁcers are rarely disciplined and al-
most never criminally prosecuted is so common partly because it is true.”).
31. The direct perpetrators of international crimes are just a “cog in the wheel” of a sys-
tem. See Victoria F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. Penn. L. Rev.
1691, at 1729–30 (2003) (“[O]ur attention to individualized notions of voluntariness already
assumes the state out of the picture. By focusing our attention on voluntariness as a feature
of individual conduct (as opposed to the defendant’s relation to the state), we have chosen a
particular level of analysis. We have chosen to ignore the institutional effects of the case.”). 
32. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 Harv. L.
Rev. 959, 961, (1992) (concluding, “The core of criminal law doctrine, centred around the
concept of mens rea and the variety of criminal excuses, probably comes closer than any
other set of social practices to . . . [a] conception of the responsible human subject . . . char-
acterized exclusively by a rational free will unencumbered by character, temperament, and
circumstances.”); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 319
(1996) (“any being who is held responsible must be sufﬁciently rational and autonomous.”).
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context.33 To achieve the aforementioned aims, this paper will attempt to
synthesize factual and theoretical knowledge—in other words, empirical facts
from the social sciences and the doctrinal points of law.34 Thus this paper rec-
ognizes that the social science ﬁeld is able to supply the ICL ﬁeld with rele-
vant empirical data that address issues of volition and reason, and possibly
with the relative weight to grant macro-level structural, situational, and cul-
tural phenomena.35 The main argument is that international crimes are com-
mitted in settings where individuals feel powerless, unduly constrained, and
unfairly treated. Such crimes are therefore not a product of horizontal inter-
actions between individual perpetrators at equidistance from each other;
rather they are vertical interactions involving a chain of subordinates with the
superior at the top—the powerful v. the powerless, the winners v. losers, the
strong v. the weak.36 The paper is divided into three main conceptual parts.
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33. See Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity,
105 Colum. L. Rev. 1768 (2005) (observing that Fletcher and Drumbl “entertained the pos-
sibility that the ﬁrst principle of domestic criminal law—personal culpability—may have
to be modiﬁed or abandoned, if international law is ever to successfully ‘adapt . . . the
paradigm of individual guilt to the cauldron of collective violence’ epitomized by mass
atrocity,” quoting Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing International Criminal Justice, 103 Mich.
L. Rev. 1295, 1309 (2005)). See also Claus Kreß, Claus Roxin’s Lehre von der
Organisationsherrschaft und das Volkerstrafrecht, 153 Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht,
304 (2006) (discussing the vertical dimension of system criminality, “Here the brains or
mastermind behind the criminal act is treated as the principal perpetrator rather than an
accomplice to the crime.”); Kai Ambos, Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command
Responsibility, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 159, 179–83 (2007) (similarly discussing the concept of
Organisationsherrschaft). 
34. See, generally, Richard Lempert, Between Cup and Lip: Social Science Inﬂuences
on Law and Policy, 10 Law & Pol’y 167 (1988).
35. See Deborah Woo, Cultural “Anomalies” and Cultural Defenses: Towards an
Integrated Theory of Homicide and Suicide, 32 Int’l J. Soc. 279 (2004). 
36. Essentially leaders have “dominated” followers on a macro level. According to
Foucault, domination can be activated when the relations of power are organized in such
a way that they are “perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely lim-
ited.” See M. Foucault, The Ethics of the Self as a Practice of Freedom, in The Final
Foucault, 1–21, 12 (James Bernauer & David Rasmussen eds., 1994). See R. George Wright,
The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most
Deprived, 43 Cath. U. L. Rev., 459 (1994) (pointing out the illogic of imputing moral re-
sponsibility to the most deprived individuals); Anthony Duff, Punishment, Citizenship
and Responsibility, in Punishment, Excuses and Moral Development, 23 (Henry Tam ed.,
1996) (pointing out that structural inequalities constitute the strongest moral basis for dis-
advantaged offenders to resist punishment, “not because their actions are justiﬁed, not
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The ﬁrst part identiﬁes the roots of current defects in the framework for
excuse and mitigation under international criminal law. Here the main
arguments are that the conceptual misconstruction of perpetrators of
wartime atrocities37—that is, Mr. or Ms. Anybody—and the relegation of
excuse from the guilt phase to the sentencing phase have largely combined
to undermine the concepts of excuse and mitigation under international
criminal law. The second part of the paper identiﬁes overlaps, gaps, and
ambiguities in the current framework for excuse and mitigation under in-
ternational criminal law. The ﬁnal part involves an attempt to modify the
current system of excuse and mitigation.
I .  TH E CONCE PTUAL FRAM EWOR K FOR EXCUS E AN D
M ITIGATION: U N D E R LYI NG R EASON S OF D E FECTS
In the discussion below, it will be demonstrated that substantive and pro-
cedural factors are responsible for current difﬁculties experienced with the
implementation of the concepts of excuse and mitigation in the ICL con-
text. Substantively, the main problem lies in the conceptual construction
of a perpetrator of wartime atrocities. In other words, the following fun-
damental question is inadequately answered at present: What motivates a
wartime offender to commit international crimes?38 It is argued below that
individuals who commit atrocities in the context of war do not ﬁt neatly
into the label of “crazy” or “sick,” because they act in response to external
rather than internal stimuli. Finally, procedurally, the key issue pertains to
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because they ought to be excused, but because we lack the moral standing to condemn
them”). In feminist legal theory, Kathryn Abrams contends that liberalism concentrating
on individual autonomy does not adequately capture the concept of agency because it
“mutes . . . differences in power or social circumstances,” K. Abrams, Sex Wars Redux, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 304, 361 (1995). 
37. The term “perpetrators of wartime atrocities” refers to the foot soldiers who are often
the primary perpetrators of international crimes. See, e.g., Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding
Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From Yamashita to Blasˇkic´ and Beyond, 5 J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 638, 639 (2007) (observing that “a fundamental dilemma of legal responses to
mass atrocity . . . is that the atrocities are usually carried out by foot soldiers but it is often
the generals and presidents who bear a greater share of moral responsibility”).
38. See Herbert, C. Kelman, Violence without Moral Restraint: Reﬂections on the
Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers, 29 J. Soc. Issues, 26–61 (Posing the same
question). 
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the logic of combining guilt with punishment exclusively at the sentenc-
ing phase. It will be contended below that such an approach arguably
blurs the distinction between excuse and mitigation. 
A. Conceptual Misconstruction of a Perpetrator of Wartime
Atrocities 
The general narrative of wartime violence depicts men and women who
commit genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as monsters.39
ICL judges have been willing to accept only very speciﬁc and simpliﬁed
characterizations of war criminals and the forces that drive them to com-
mit atrocities, as reﬂected in the limited range of excuse defenses available
to this category of offenders. Rather than devising a framework for assess-
ing the reasonableness of the actions of those who commit atrocities in time
of war, the judges have resorted to the “how do we feel about it”40 heuris-
tic and therefore have proceeded on the premise that those who commit
atrocities fall into a category of psychological dysfunction. The current per-
spective arguably compromises a defendant’s right to a fair trial by wrongly
inducing that defendant to assert inaccurate and harmful defenses such as
insanity and diminished responsibility.41 Under this perspective, the defen-
dant cannot simply assert as a defense that state propaganda42 caused him
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39. See J.E. Alvarez, supra note 30, 2037–40 (arguing that the Nuremberg trials en-
couraged the public perception that “Nazi war criminals were merely an especially evil col-
lection of gangsters bent solely on aggressive conquest”). See Prosecutor v. Tadic´, Case No.
IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment, 59 (July 14, 1999) (“[F]or such a man to have committed
these crimes requires an even greater evil will on his part than that of a lesser man.”); see
also Alex Ross, Television View: Watching for a Judgment of Real Evil, N.Y. Times, Nov.
12, 1995, at B37 (drawing attention to the coverage of Dusko Tadic´’s trial by Court TV).
40. See Norbert Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Moods Inﬂuence Judgments and
Processing, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, 539 (Thomas
Gilovich, Dale Grifﬁn, & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (“[W]hen the judgment is overly
complex and cumbersome to make . . . individuals are likely to resort to the ‘How-do-I-
feel-about-it?’ heuristic.”). 
41. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Larkin, The Insanity Defense Founded on Ethnic Oppression:
Defending the Accused in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
21 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l &. Comp. L. 91 (2001). 
42. “Whether we like it or not, there is a ‘science’ of inﬂuencing others. The most suc-
cessful by-products of this science are the minor arts of propagandizing, advertising and
political manoeuvring”; see Ernst G. Beier & Evans G. Valens, People-Reading: How We
Control Others, How They Control Us, 15, (1975). 
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or her to act; rather defendant must mold the truth into the framework of
a diminished responsibility or insanity defense.43
However, both insanity and diminished responsibility compromise the
integrity of the international criminal justice system by masking the role
of state propaganda in the commission of international crimes. A case in
point is the Banovic´ judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).44 The defense submitted that a number of
factors should be taken into account in assessing the criminal liability of
the accused. They included the following: the low rank of the accused;
the state of mind of the accused who, it was submitted, never intended
to kill anyone; and the effect of the aggressive wartime propaganda on the
accused. Yet despite this, the Trial Chamber came to the conclusion that
“the Defence has fallen short of raising a defence of diminished mental
responsibility in mitigation.”45 This was an unfortunate conclusion given
the ample evidence of the role played by social elites in engineering mass
atrocities in the context of the former Yugoslavia. In this respect, Cerovic´
made the following statement in relation to the conﬂict in the former
Yugoslavia: “[T]he war did not start spontaneously at all. On the con-
trary, it took years of careful preparation, fuelled by horrifying national-
istic propaganda. . . . Television and other powerful media smoothly
switched from communist to nationalist rhetoric and propaganda incit-
ing war. The media was under the strict control of government; many
journalists, who never learned to be independent, readily accepted the
new directions. . . . In the ﬁnal phase nationalism can actually evolve be-
yond madness. . . .”46
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43. International criminal law (ICL) is not alone in this. Of interest here is V.F. Nourse,
supra note 31, at 1733 (“Currently, our only option in a crudely descriptive, hyper individ-
ualistic world appears to be to pathologize defendants, to render them sick, insane, or
somehow subject to special rules for special classes. The poor town drunk, poor battered
woman, and the poor ill-educated Native American: they are sick and all good liberals
should have compassion. But this kind of condescension, however wrapped up in kind-
ness, risks blindness to oppressive relations.”).
44. See Prosecutor v. Banovic´, Case No. It-02-65/1-S Trial Chamber (Oct. 28, 2003). 
45. See ibid, para. 79.
46. See Stojan Cerovic, The Rise of Serbian Nationalism, 26 N.Y.U. J. Int’L L. & Pol.
527, 528–30 (1994); see also F. Gopalani Ameer, The International Standard of Direct and
Public Incitement to Commit Genocide: An Obstacle to U.S. Ratiﬁcation of the
International Criminal Court Statute, 32 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 87, 110 (2001) (making a similar
observation).
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It is clear from the above that, by seeking to describe mass atrocities as
originating from mental illness, international criminal law is in effect pro-
viding a distorted picture of both the psychological makeup of the ac-
cused—that is, the actual source and content of an accused’s goal, desires,
values, and emotions—as well as the bearing of each of these factors on
the moral agency of that accused.47 In this respect, the following statement
by Oberschall conﬁrms that atrocities were perpetrated by ordinary men
and women in the former Yugoslavia out of normality processes instead of
out of abnormality processes: 
For explaining ethnic manipulation one needs the concept of a cognitive
frame. A cognitive frame is a mental structure which situates and connects
events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social
world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared
with others. Yugoslavs experienced ethnic relations through two frames: a
normal frame and a crisis frame. People possessed both frames in their
minds: in peaceful times the crisis frame was dormant, and in crisis and war
the normal frame was suppressed. . . . 
The crisis frame was grounded in the experiences and memories of the
Balkan wars. In these crises, civilians were not distinguished from combat-
ants. . . . Everyone was held collectively responsible for their nationality and
religion, and became a target for of revenge and reprisals. . . . 
If the normal frame prevailed in the 1980s . . . how did the nationalists
activate and amplify the crisis frame after decades of dormancy? The emo-
tion that poisons ethnic relations is fear . . . : fear of extinction as a group,
fear of assimilation, fear of domination by another group, fear of one’s life
and property, fear of being a victim once more. After fear comes hate. The
threatening others are demonized and dehumanized. The means of awak-
ening such fears were through the news media, politics, education, popular
culture, literature, history and the arts.48
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47. On subliminal conditioning of attitudes, see Jon A. Krosnick, Andrew L. Betz, Lee
J. Jussim, & Ann R. Lynn, Subliminal Conditioning of Attitudes, 18(2) Personality & Soc.
Psychol. Bull. 152–62, 158–59 (1992) (“An entire childhood spent hearing a group of people
referred to with negative affect or seeing them, either in the media or in reality, associated
with situations that arouse negative affect may generate a fairly strong negative attitude. This
attitude may lead an individual to generate consonant beliefs about the group’s characteris-
tics.”). See I. Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, supra note
2, 571 (“The commission of crimes may be encouraged . . . by various techniques affecting
the offender’s judgment as to what constitutes prohibited conduct. That way the actor may
be manipulated, lured or indoctrinated to commit crimes. . . .”).
48. See Anthony Oberschall, The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic
Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia, 23:6 Ethnic & Racial Stud. 982–1001, at
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It follows from the above that, far from being crazy, those who killed
possibly acted out of fear induced by manipulation to which almost any-
body in any country could have succumbed.49 What is needed, therefore,
is to review the speciﬁc and simpliﬁed characterizations of the forces that
drive ordinary people to commit wartime atrocities, which currently per-
meates available legal excuses.
B. Fusion of Guilt and Punishment Determinations 
A perusal of ICL cases reveals a tendency to combine guilt with punish-
ment exclusively at the sentencing phase.50 The Cesic´ case51 shall be em-
ployed to illustrate preliminary concerns about this practice. In the Cesic´
case, the accused plea of an acute stress reaction to the war was discussed
in the sentencing phase, where it was placed under personal circumstances
and dealt with alongside issues such as his family life and his childhood,52
as is evident below:
Personal Circumstances 
(a) Argument of the Parties 
The Defence alleges a number of personal circumstances to mitigate pun-
ishment. These include the following. 
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989–90 (2000); see also The International Spread of Ethnic Conﬂict: Fear, Diffusion and
Escalation (David A. Lake & Donald Rothchild eds., 1998). It has been pointed out by psy-
chologists that the intensity of emotions alters perceptual cognitive, expressive, and phys-
iological systems; see, e.g., Nico H. Frijda, The Emotions (1986); Richard S. Lazarus,
Emotion and Adaptation (1991).
49. For seminal work on fear appeals, see Irving L. Janis & Seymour Feshbach, Effects
of Fear-Arousing Communications, J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 48, 78–92 (1953). For the
persuasive effects of fear appeals, see Franklin J. Boster & Paul Mongeau, Fear-Arousing
Persuasive Messages, in Communication Yearbook 8, 330–75 (Robert N. Bostrom ed., 1984);
Paul A. Mongeau, Another Look at Fear-Arousing Persuasive Appeals, in Persuasion:
Advances Through Meta-Analysis, 53–68 (Michael Allen & Raymond W. Preiss eds., 2000). 
50. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007–1008 (1993) (noting that there is a “fun-
damental difference between the nature of the guilt/innocence determination at issue . . .
and the nature of the life/death choice at the penalty phase.” In the latter phase it states
that “the jury then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the
appropriate punishment. . . .”).
51. See Prosecutor v. Cesic´, Sentencing Judgment, IT-95-10/1-S (Mar. 11, 2004).
52. See Krug, supra note 26, at 329 (suggesting that the placement of issues that affect
guilt with those that affect punishment at the sentencing phase arises from procedural dif-
ferences between continental law and common law. Continental systems adhere to this ap-
proach whilst common law systems reject such an approach.). 
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(i) Ranko Cesic was brought up by his mother after his parents 
divorced; 
(ii) He is married with no children; 
(iii) The fact that Ranko Cesic´ and his partner’s incomes were low
proves that he did not personally gain during the conﬂict, which
the Defence presents as a rare phenomenon; 
(iv) At the time of commission of the crimes he was 27 years old; and 
(v) The crimes were committed during the ﬁrst weeks of the war at a
time of chaos, confusion and in a context of widespread propa-
ganda, when Ranko Cesic´’s behaviour was affected by an acute stress
reaction to the war.53
In general there are three main problems with the approach of mixing
relatively minor issues—such as the accused’s age, his marital status, the
fact that he was brought up by his mother after his parents divorced, and
the fact that he and his partner’s incomes were low—with a fundamental
issue such as post-traumatic stress disorder. First, it has the effect of blurring
the distinction between excuse and mitigation. In this respect, Hill noted
that “prior good deeds, support of family, lack of previous misbehaviour—
do not have the same intrinsic connection to moral blame as do the emo-
tions and motivations underlying the criminal act itself. These
characteristics of the actor are temporally and causally separate from the
act the criminal law seeks to punish.”54 It follows that, under the current
perspective, there is a danger that defendants who attribute their conduct
to unusual exogenous pressures and not to moral deﬁciency are unfairly
equated with those seeking the right to commit crimes at a reduced cost. 
Second, such an approach undermines crucial culpability determina-
tions. In relation to this, Morse lists a catalogue of problems arising from
allowing judges to assess culpability issues at the purely discretionary sen-
tencing stage:
Although partial responsibility can in principle be fully considered at sen-
tencing, this method suffers from substantial defects. First and most impor-
tant, sentencing is a matter of discretion. Judges may refuse to give reduced
rationality its just mitigating force, and there may be wide disparities among
judges sentencing similarly situated defendants. Judges, like all members of
a society, have some implicit or explicit “theory” of responsibility and how
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53. See Prosecutor v. Cesic´, supra note 51, at paras. 88–89.
54. See Rachael A. Hill, Character, Choice, and “Aberrant Behavior,” 65 U. Chi. L. Rev.
975, 985 (1998).
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it should guide punishment. Judges’ responsibility theories will also differ
substantially. There is no guarantee that any individual judge’s theory will
be consonant with what the legislature or other more representative groups
would agree is fair, and thus, the judge’s mitigation decision may not com-
port with community norms. Moreover, mitigating primarily at sentencing
removes this important culpability determination from the highly visible
trial stage, at which the community’s representative—the jury—makes the
decision, and relegates it to the comparatively low visibility sentencing pro-
ceeding. Our criminal justice system has a preference for making crucial
culpability determinations that affect punishment at trial. Partial responsi-
bility is an explicitly normative judgment that should be made, therefore,
by the community’s representatives at the guilt phase, and not by judges at
sentencing.55
Finally, the approach of combining factors that are causally remote from
the criminal act with those that are causally proximate “defeats the purpose
of individualized sentencing in a bifurcated proceeding.”56 Crocker has ar-
gued that “[t]he punishment-phase determination is not a recapitulation of
the guilt-phase decision, but both a reconceptualization of the defendant’s
guilt-phase culpability and the consideration of new factors relevant only
to punishment.”57 It follows that the main concern here is that combining
issues relevant to guilt with those pertaining to punishment together at the
sentencing phase introduces the danger that punishment decision will re-
ﬂect only the blameworthiness of the defendant and not both the defen-
dant’s blameworthiness and culpability for the crime. 
I I .  EXCUS E AN D M ITIGATION: OVE R LAPS,  GAPS,  
AN D AM B IG U ITI E S 
Having laid the groundwork for understanding why the framework for ex-
cuse and mitigation under international criminal law is defective in section II,
this section will attempt to identify and analyze overlaps, gaps, and ambigu-
ities arising from the substantive and procedural defects identiﬁed above. 
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55. See Stephen Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 Ohio St.
J. Crim. L. 289–308, 298–99 (2003).
56. See Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness, 66 Fordham
L. Rev. 21, 26 (1997).
57. See ibid. 
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A. Excuse Defenses and Mitigating Circumstances 
Under international criminal law, the equation of guilt with punish-
ment has arguably led to the collapsing of the distinction between ex-
cuse and mitigating circumstance. This viewpoint is supported by the
fact that presently a wide range of factors are often miscategorized as
mitigating. As stated by Harmon and Gaynor: “ICTY jurisprudence
has identified a considerable number of mitigating circumstances, but
does not clearly distinguish between those circumstances which miti-
gate guilt (such as duress and diminished mental responsibility) and
those which have no effect on criminal responsibility, but mitigate the
appropriate punishment (such as a guilty plea, voluntary surrender, co-
operation with the Prosecution, remorse, post-crime efforts at reconcil-
iation or ill-health).”58
Furthermore, in support of the opinion that excuse defenses overlap
with mitigating circumstances is a systematic analysis of the following se-
lected cases. In the Plavsic´ case, the meaning of the term of “mitigating”
is evident in the following statement: “A Trial Chamber has the discretion
to consider any other factors which it considers to be of a mitigating na-
ture. These factors will vary with the circumstances of each case. In addi-
tion to substantial co-operation with the Prosecutor, Chambers of the
International Tribunal have found the following factors relevant to this
case to be mitigating: voluntary surrender; a guilty plea; expression of re-
morse; good character with no prior criminal conviction; and the post-
conﬂict conduct of the accused.”59 It is submitted that these above
constitute mitigating circumstances because they do not have the same in-
trinsic connection to moral blame as excuse defenses. In other words, they
are characteristics of the actor that are temporally and causally separate
from the act that an ICL tribunal or court seeks to punish. They are there-
fore only relevant to penalties. 
However, other cases have distorted the meaning of “mitigating” or
“mitigation” in the ICL context by including excuse defenses in the
Plavsic´ list and by treating both in an identical manner. For instance, in
relation to duress, the Trial Chamber in the Erdemovic´ case noted that
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58. See Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary
Crimes, 5 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 683, 690 (2007).
59. See Prosecutor v. Plavsic´, IT-00-39-6k 40/1-S, Sentencing Judgement, Trial
Chamber, para. 65 (Feb. 27, 2003).
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duress “may be taken into account only by way of mitigation.”60 The
Erdemovic´ case itself draws attention to the problematic status of duress
under international criminal law.61 It should be recalled that the ICTY
Trial Chamber in its sentencing judgment of November 29, 1996,62 held
that duress can be a complete defense to international crimes; speciﬁcally,
“while the complete defence based on moral duress and/or a state of ne-
cessity stemming from superior orders is not ruled out absolutely, its con-
ditions of application are particularly strict.”63 Also at the Appellate level,
the Appeals Chamber rejected by a very narrow majority of 3–2 the Trial
Chamber’s ﬁnding on duress as a complete defense.64 On the one hand,
Judge Li65 concurred with the opinions of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
that duress is not a complete defense but merely a mitigating factor.66 On
the other hand, both Judge Cassese and Judge Stephen were of the opin-
ion that duress should constitute a complete defense. Judge Cassese in his
dissenting opinion wrote: “after ﬁnding that no specific international rule
has evolved on the question of whether duress affords a complete defence
to the killing of innocent persons, the majority should have drawn the
only conclusion imposed by law and logic, namely that the general rule on
duress should apply.” 67 Judge Stephen in his dissenting opinion stated that
“[i]t is for the foregoing reasons that I conclude that, despite the exception
which the common law makes to the availability of duress in cases of mur-
der where the choice is truly between one life or another, the defence of
duress can be adopted into international law as deriving from a general
principle of law recognized by the world’s major legal systems, at least
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60. See Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic´, Case No. IT-96-22-T bis, Sentencing
Judgement, para. 17 (March 5, 1998).
61. See, e.g., Peter Rowe, Duress as a Defence to War Crimes after Erdemovic, 1 Y.B.
Int’l Humanitarian L., 210 (1998); David Turns, The International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia: The Erdemovic Case, 47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 461 (1998); Robert
Cryer, One Appeal, Four Opinions, Two Philosophies and a Remittal, 2 J. Armed Conﬂict
L. 193 (1998).
62. See Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic´, Case No. IT-96-22-T, T.Ch. I, Sentencing
Judgement (Nov. 29, 1996).
63. See ibid, para. 19.
64. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, Case No. IT-96- 22-A, Oct. 7, 1997 (ICTY Appeals
Chamber).
65. See ibid., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li. 
66. See ibid., Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah.
67. See ibid., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, para. 11.
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where that exception does not apply.”68 In addition, disagreements in the
Erdemovic´ case were fuelled by inconsistencies under post-Nuremberg trials
and under domestic law. All of this has led to a general state of uncertainty
as to whether duress constitutes an excuse or a mitigating circumstance in
the ICL context. 
A second problematic situation involves the plea of diminished respon-
sibility. In relation to diminished responsibility, the Appeals Chamber in
the Celebici case gave the following explanations of its status: “the relevant
general principle of law . . . is that the defendant’s diminished mental re-
sponsibility is relevant to the sentence to be imposed and is not a defence
leading to an acquittal in the true sense. . . . Rule 67(A)(ii)(b) must there-
fore be interpreted as referring to diminished mental responsibility where
it is to be raised by the defendant as a matter in mitigation of sentence. As
a defendant bears the onus of establishing matters in mitigation of sen-
tence, where he relies upon diminished mental responsibility in mitigation,
he must establish that condition on the balance of probabilities—that more
probably than not such a condition existed at the relevant time.”69 Sparr,
for instance, criticized the confusion surrounding the status of dimin-
ished responsibility under international criminal law, as is evident in the
following statement: “By not accepting the diminished-responsibility
contention of defense, and therefore not demonstrating how their partic-
ular reduced-mental-capacity interpretation was applicable to future ICTY
judgments, the Chamber in effect remained silent and left the matter in
doubt. A key question is whether diminished responsibility is better con-
sidered as an afﬁrmative defense or a sentencing mitigation factor. This is
an important issue that can have signiﬁcant substantive and procedural
consequences.”70
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68. See ibid., Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen, para. 66.
69. See Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al, Judgement, Case No. IT-96-21-A, para. 590 (Feb. 20,
2001).
70. See Landy F. Sparr, Mental Incapacity Defences at War Crimes Tribunals: Question
and Controversy, 33 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 59–70, 64 (2005); Albin Eser, Article 31:
Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in Commentary of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 863–93, 875 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2nd ed. 2008) (point-
ing out that the Rome Statute treats diminished criminal responsibility as only a mitigat-
ing factor). See also Antonio Cassese, Int’l Crim. L. 224–28 (2003) (explaining that the
post-World War II trials similarly treated diminished criminal responsibility as only a mit-
igating factor). 
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It follows from the above that excuse defenses now signiﬁcantly overlap
with mitigating circumstances under international criminal law. These
overlaps are unfortunate because excuse defenses are primarily meant to
relieve the accused of criminal responsibility and are taken into account by
a fact ﬁnder before the verdict. Not only do they affect the ﬁnal penalty,
they also result in a change in the category of crime or offense with which
the accused is ultimately convicted.71 They are therefore fundamentally
different from mitigating circumstances, which come into the picture at
the sentencing stage as a key criterion of punishment once a defendant is
convicted and which, as a result, have no bearing on the assessment of
guilt or innocence.72 In this respect, it is worth devoting attention to the
viewpoint that both categories of defendants are similar—one argument is
that it is questionable whether, in moral terms, murder is necessarily less
culpable when performed in anger as a result of provocation, by a defendant
whose conduct resulted from unusual exogenous pressures, than when
performed out of cool deliberation by one who is merely seeking to receive
moral credit for previously leading an exemplary life. Indeed it is possible
to make the argument that it is morally unsustainable for anger and sud-
den loss of self-control to constitute the basis of a defense to crimes such
as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.73 A second argu-
ment is that, from the perspective of sentencing, there is no difference be-
tween a provoked killer and a cold-blooded killer who subsequently shows
remorse. This argument can be sustained to some extent because both types
of offenders, when compared to a killer who shows no remorse, share one
main characteristic: they are both reformable. In the Blaskic´ case, the Trial
Chamber74 made the following relevant statement vis-à-vis the relevance of
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71. See P. Krug, supra note 26, at 329 (“[R]educed capacity [the English variant] does
not serve as a justiﬁcation for mitigating sentences. Instead, this variant reduces the level
of criminal responsibility by ﬁnding an accused guilty of a lesser included offence instead
of the higher crime for which he or she would have been liable but for reduced capacity.”).
72. See generally R. Hill, supra note 54, 975.
73. For critical literature in this area, see, e.g., Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson,
Is It Time to Pull the Plug on the Hostile versus Instrumental Aggression Dichotomy?, 108
Psychol. Rev. 273, 273–79 (2001). For criminal law literature in support of the abolition
of all partial excuses, including the defense of provocation, see Stephen J. Morse,
Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 30
(1984). 
74. See Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement (Mar. 3, 2000).
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an accused’s character traits to sentencing: “The character traits are not so
much examined in order to understand the reasons for the crime but more
to assess the possibility of rehabilitating the accused. High moral standards
are also indicative of the accused’s character.”75
Both arguments are however problematic. In relation to the ﬁrst argu-
ment pertaining to the unsustainability of anger as a defense to international
crimes, conceptually, it is illogical to equate hot-blooded actors76 with cold-
blooded killers. The reason is that the former commit crimes because they
failed to exercise the requisite degree of self control.77 Whilst they deserved
to be punished for this failure, the law nevertheless should deem them to be
less culpable and deserving of a lesser punishment than someone who kills
with full mental capacity, whether or not that person subsequently volun-
tary surrenders, pleads guilty, shows remorse, or had a previous good char-
acter with no prior criminal conviction.78 Also, it is not certain that war
criminals generally act out of anger; many may have acted out of fear, which
is viewed as a less problematic alternative basis for a plea of provocation.79
On the other hand, in terms of the second argument involving the equation
of a provoked killer with a deﬁant killer who subsequently shows remorse,80
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75. See ibid, para. 780.
76. See William Sargant, Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and
Brainwashing, 79, 84, 99 (1985) (inter alia explaining that, in programming for political con-
version, the speaker deliberately provokes nervous tension in the form of anger or anxiety to
ensure undivided attention, increased suggestibility, and impaired judgment). For criminal
law literature in support of retaining all partial excuses, including the provocation defense,
see Joshua Dressler, Reafﬁrming the Moral Legitimacy of the Doctrine of Diminished
Capacity: A Brief Reply to Professor Morse, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 953 (1984). 
77. See Julius Kühl, Emotion, Cognition and Motivation: II. The Functional
Signiﬁcance of Emotions in Perception, Memory, Problem-Solving, and Overt Action,
2(4) Sprache Kognit 228–53 (1983) (Angry people are “prone to impulsive judgment and
action.”). See also Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The
Differential Impact of Anger and Sadness, 24(1) Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 48 (1994).
78. See Coke, supra note 19, 47 (“Murder is when a man of sound memory [kills
another] . . . with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party, or implied by law.”); 1
Matthew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 455 (1778) (“When one voluntarily
kills another without any provocation, it is murder, for the law presumes it to be malicious.”). 
79. See Alex Reilly, Loss of Self-Control in Provocation, 21 Crim. L. F. 320, 330 (1997)
(noting that fear is mixed with anger in situations involving the provocation defense). 
80. For example, see United States v. Lewis, 111 F. 630, 634 (W.D. Tex. 1901) (“[The de-
fendant’s act] . . . was not the result of a cool, deliberate judgment, and previous malignity
of heart, but solely imputable to human inﬁrmity.”).
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the following hypothetical shall be employed to demonstrate why such an
equation is unwise: An accused kills his own neighbor. He admits to the
crime. Here a sentencing judge will see the admission as a sign of culpabil-
ity and sentence the defendant by appropriately calibrating the culpability
punishment to the level of blameworthiness surrounding killings resulting
from a calculated decision. Now change the hypothetical, so that the sen-
tencing judge knows this additional fact: the accused has no previous crim-
inal record, is married and has two children, is nineteen years of age, has
demonstrated remorse for the act committed and has shown a strong sense
of compassion toward the victim, and ﬁnally, the accused is in poor health. 
The sentencing judge might well consider these facts as relevant to
whether the accused has a reduced need for rehabilitation. But for the pur-
pose of retribution, is the accused’s previously clean record, together with
the other positive personal circumstances, relevant to his desert? My sus-
picion is that most of us would probably be against the idea of a sentenc-
ing discount for the accused. However, it appears from the jurisprudence
of the ICTY that the accused who kills his neighbor would have his desert
calculated on the basis of both the gravity of the offense and the mitigat-
ing factors mentioned above. Under this approach, once the murder is
weighed against the quality of the accused’s entire life, the commission of
murder weighs less than it otherwise would weigh, and the impact of the
cumulative weight of good conduct would thereby lessen his desert for the
murder.81 In other words, in measuring the harm caused by the defendant,
sentencers under international criminal law have decided to broaden the
relevant temporal context to take into account the defendant’s record of
good deeds.82 Harmon and Gaynor have criticized this approach as con-
stituting a dilution of the accused sentence: “The cumulative effect of a
Trial Chamber recognizing multiple factors of mitigation may result in a
signiﬁcant sentence reduction. When combined with the consistent ICTY
practice of approving the release of convicted persons after they have
served two-thirds of their sentences, sentences are signiﬁcantly diluted,
and a participant in large-scale crimes will be freed after a relatively short
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81. For a critical analysis of these issues, see Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of
Conduct and Character to Guilt and Punishment, 10 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Pol’y, 99, 99–100 (1996). 
82. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Dragan Obrenovic´, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing
Judgement, para. 134 (Dec. 10, 2003) (Good character is an “important mitigating factor.”).
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prison term.”83 It follows from the above that mitigation of punishment on
the basis of good character could convey the message that an offender will
be treated leniently as long as he or she has a previously clean record. Given
that international criminal trials involve the prosecution of very serious
crimes, such an approach could be perceived as a denial of justice for vic-
tims.84 Finally, the foregoing discussion has demonstrated that the bound-
aries between excuse and mitigating circumstances need clariﬁcation. 
B. Mental Abnormality (diminished responsibility) 
and Mental Normality (provocation)
Under international criminal law as exempliﬁed by the statutes and ju-
risprudence of the ICTY and ICTR (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda), there is a liberal policy toward the admissibility of evidence rel-
evant to volitional impairment. As stated by Krug: “The normative struc-
ture of international criminal law does not pose any explicit prospective
barriers to the admissibility of evidence: courts are authorized to admit all
relevant evidence deemed to have probative value. For instance, the ICTY
and ICTR deﬁnition of mental incapacity is broadly stated, without any
prospectively applied categorical exclusion. In addition, it includes the
concept of volitional impairment, which is expressed in terms of the in-
ability to control one’s actions.”85 It follows that the incorporation of the
concept of volitional impairment into the legislative structures of the
ICTY and ICTR considerably expands the range of potentially applicable
causal factors. This opens the way for the admissibility of evidence on
both internal and external causes of volitional impairment and, further,
suggests that both provocation (psychological normality) and diminished
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83. See Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 58, at 689.
84. See John Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, 98 (1970) (“Punishment is a conventional
device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation and of judgments of
disapproval and reprobation on the part of the punishing authority himself or those ‘in
whose name’ the punishment is inﬂicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic signiﬁcance
largely missing from other kinds of penalty. . . .”) Following this line of reasoning, a fail-
ure to punish equates to a tacit approval of the conduct that has been perpetrated. See also
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality, ch. 1 (1979) (emphasizing
the importance of consistency in sentencing); John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural
Rights, 26364 (1980).
85. See Krug, supra note 26, at 323–24.
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responsibility86 (psychological abnormality 87) are admissible to prove lack
of capacity. 
However, the degree to which either of the two defenses is redundant
with or complementary to the other is as yet unclear. In this respect, the
Banovic´ and Celebici judgments demonstrate how the separation of the
two defenses under international criminal law has created a gap in cover-
age into which a worthy defendant could land, ﬁnding no avail in either
of the two defenses. As will now be demonstrated, the accused in both
cases appeared to have fallen into such a gap. It is therefore worth dis-
cussing both cases in detail. In the Banovic´ case, the accused criminal re-
sponsibility was linked to the ill-treatment of non-Serbs from Prijedor at
Keraterm camp.88 The indictment alleged that, between May 24, 1992, and
August 30, 1992, the Keraterm camp, amongst others, was operated in a
manner designed to ill-treat and persecute non-Serbs from Prijedor and
other areas as a means to rid the territory of, or to subjugate, non-Serbs.
The accused, who served as a camp guard during that period, admitted his
participation in several persecutory acts including the murder of ﬁve pris-
oners; the beating of twenty-seven detainees; and the conﬁnement in in-
humane conditions, harassment, humiliation, and psychological abuse of
Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia Croats, and other non-Serbs detained at the
Keraterm camp. The defense put forward a number of factors, all related
to the personal circumstances of the accused, which, it claimed, should
mitigate the sentence. 
The most relevant of these factors was evidence introduced about the per-
sonality of the accused through a report prepared by Dr. Miklos Biro, a pro-
fessor of clinical psychology at the University of Novi Sad, which was said to
be based on “data of the case” as described in the indictment and obtained
from the defense team, as well as interviews with the accused and his family.89
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86. See R v. Byrne [1960] 2 Q.B. 396, 403 (classifying diminished responsibility as an
excusatory defense).
87. See ibid. (deﬁning “abnormality of mind” as “a state of mind so different from that
of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal . . . wide
enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical
acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right
or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance
with that rational judgment”).
88. See Prosecutor v. Banovic´, supra note 44.
89. See ibid, para. 77.
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The summary of the “forensic psychological analysis” described the accused
as a person of normal, below-average intelligence who shows signs of emo-
tional immaturity, especially characterized by “bad impulse control.” The
accused was said to have incorporated the authoritarian behavior model of
his father, so that he was submissive to superiors and strict to subordinates.
The report observed that with his low education and modest intellectual
capabilities, the accused easily succumbed to the war propaganda that
spread collective hatred and rumours about the enemy’s brutality. In
Dr. Biro’s view, the combined effect of the war propaganda and authori-
tarian behavior help to explain why, psychologically, the accused did not
understand the criminality of his behavior. The report nonetheless con-
cluded that “the accused was able to understand general social and legal
norms, as well as to anticipate the consequences of their disregard.”90
Finally, Dr. Biro observed that the accused “is now fully aware of the so-
cial, moral, and legal context of his acts”91 as a result of the proceedings
against him and his detention. 
Basically the defense employed this report to establish that the ac-
cused’s low level of education and modest intellectual capabilities affected
his culpability. In response, the Trial Chamber noted that, in advancing
the evidence contained in Dr. Biro’s report, the defense had fallen short of
raising a defense of diminished mental responsibility in mitigation.92 It re-
jected the assessment contained in Dr. Biro’s report to the effect that the
accused may have been unable to appreciate the unlawfulness of his con-
duct. The Trial Chamber held inter alia that it did not accept the argu-
ment that the accused did not have the strength of character to resist the
war propaganda, and that the gravity of the crimes suggests that the ac-
cused voluntarily participated in them. Thus the accused fell into a nor-
mative gap because, although the Trial Chamber found that his low level
of education and modest intellectual capabilities did not rise to the level
of diminished capacity, it failed to consider whether these two character-
istics of the accused were relevant to an alternative defense of provocation
stemming from “the war propaganda which spread collective hatred and ru-
mours about the enemy’s brutality.” The Banovic´ judgment therefore failed
to recognize the synergistic interconnection between diminished capacity
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and provocation93 stemming from the external circumstance of war
propaganda.
The Celebici judgment is a second case that highlights a gap in cover-
age between provocation and diminished responsibility under interna-
tional criminal law.94 In the Celebici judgment, one of the four accused,
Esad Landzo, a guard at the Celebici camp from approximately May to
December 1992, was charged with multiple offenses of murder and torture
as war crimes and crimes against humanity. His defense raised the plea of di-
minished responsibility, which like insanity is founded on an abnormality of
mind. The Trial Chamber distinguished between insanity and diminished
responsibility: “In the case of the plea of insanity, the accused is, at the
time of commission of the criminal act, unaware of what he is doing or
incapable of forming a rational judgement as to whether such an act is
right or wrong. By contrast, the plea of diminished responsibility is based
on the premise that, despite recognising the wrongful nature of his ac-
tions, the accused, on account of his abnormality of mind, is unable to
control his actions.”95 The case resulted in countless evaluations of the ac-
cused and the testimonies of ﬁve psychiatrists on the diagnostic criteria of
DSM-IV and ICD-9.96 There was a unanimous agreement by the psychi-
atrists that Landzo had suffered from mental disorders at the time of the
acts; the psychiatrist, however, disagreed on the speciﬁc identiﬁcation of
the accused’s psychiatric disorders. For instance, one of the psychiatrists,
Dr. Laggazi, was of the opinion that Landzo suffered from a personality dis-
order that crossed well over the pathological threshold on the abnormality/
behavior curve. He further stated that this disorder meant that Mr.
Landzo displayed the additional traits of dependency and narcissism, with
the result that his ability to exercise his free will in relation to the orders
that he received was restricted.97 In contrast, Dr. Sparr adopted the view
that the abnormality of personality Landzo exhibited had no pathological
component but merely reﬂected his personality traits.98
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93. Jeremy Horder, Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility, 10 King’s
C. L.J. 143, 143 (1999) (delineating ethical distinction but granting that “like any signiﬁ-
cant ethical distinction, the distinction’s boundaries are contested and difﬁcult to draw”).
94. See Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998). 
95. See ibid., para. 1156.
96. See ibid., para. 36.
97. See ibid., para. 1179.
98. See ibid., para. 1180.
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Ultimately, this division appeared to inﬂuence the Trial Chamber’s
opinion that, although Landzo suffered from a personality disorder, the
evidence relating to his inability to control his physical acts on account of
abnormality of mind was not at all satisfactory. It therefore found that, de-
spite his personality disorder, Landzo was quite capable of controlling his
actions.99 Given that that Landzo’s abnormality of mind was found not to
have substantially impaired his mental responsibility, the diminished re-
sponsibility plea was rejected.100 Thus Landzo, like Banovic´, fell into a nor-
mative gap: although the Trial Chamber found that his mental disorders
did not rise to the level of diminished capacity, it failed to consider his
characteristics vis-à-vis the following provocative issues:
His home town of Konjic was shelled over a continued period of time in
1992, resulting in an atmosphere of constant fear of injury or death for
himself and his family, and it was also under a blockade such that living
conditions became very difﬁcult. Many displaced persons were arriving in
the town, having been expelled from their own homes in other parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the stories of their mistreatment, and that of
the Bosnian Muslim population in general, at the hands of the Bosnian
Serbs and Croats, were undoubtedly circulating. Additionally, among the
casualties of the conﬂict were persons close to Mr. Landzo. Given that the
detainees in the Celebici prison-camp were Bosnian Serbs who had been
arrested upon the execution of military operations by Bosnian government
forces to break up pockets of resistance against the lawful authorities in the
municipality, along with Mr. Landzo’s immature and impressionable state
of mind, it is not surprising that he might identify these detainees with
the enemy that had inflicted this suffering and hardship upon himself,
his family and his fellow members of the population of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.101
EXCUSE AN D M IT IGATION | 51
99. See ibid., para. 1186.
100. Proof that international criminal law maintains a separate distinction between
provocation and diminished responsibility is evident in the following statement by the
Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Delalic´, ibid., at para. 1166: “[T]he accused must be suffer-
ing from an abnormality of mind which has substantially impaired his mental responsibil-
ity for his acts or omissions. The abnormality of mind must have arisen from a condition of
arrested or retarded development of the mind, or inherent causes induced by disease or in-
jury. These categories clearly demonstrate that the evidence is restricted to those which can
be supported by medical evidence. Consequently, killings motivated by emotions, such as
those of jealousy, rage or hate, appear to be excluded.”
101. See ibid., para. 1284. 
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Finally, the Banovic´ and Landzo decisions highlight the complete and
inﬂexible distinction between diminished responsibility and provocation
as well as normative gaps under international criminal law and the need
for a reform of this area. 
C. Duress and Coercion: Subjectivity v. Objectivity
ICL cases reveal a high degree of ambiguity in relation to situations in-
volving duress and coercion.102 One of the key issues here is whether the
relevant standard for evaluating duress103 is an objective or a subjective
standard. A second issue is whether psychological coercion can serve to
underlie duress. An analysis of the case law reveals ambiguities in relation
to both of these issues. A comparative analysis of the Erdemovic´ case104
with the Mrdja case105 will be employed to illustrate current ambiguities.
The relevant circumstances of the Erdemovic´ case are as follows: The ac-
cused, Drazen Erdemovic´, whilst serving as a soldier in the 10th Sabotage
Detachment of the Bosnian Serb Army, participated on July 16, 1995, in a
ﬁring squad that shot and killed hundreds of unarmed Bosnian Muslim
men from Srebenica. He was estimated to have personally killed seventy
people and was charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.106
It was established during his trial that he initially refused to participate,
and that only after his commanding ofﬁcer informed him that he would
be shot along with the victims did he reluctantly comply and take part in
the killings. Without going into all the details of the case, it is clear that
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102. In this article, the terms “duress” and “coercion” are used interchangeably. 
103. See Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law 146 (2005): (“[T]he
Rome Statute adopted the continental European criminal law tradition, under which
killing a person out of duress or necessity as a last resort can go unpunished. In contrast,
in common law, the killing of innocent civilians is always criminal; the presence of a situ-
ation of necessity or duress can at most lead to mitigation of punishment.”). World War II
cases similarly adopted a continental approach to duress; see, e.g., U.S. v. Ohlendorf,
4 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals 471, 480 (1948) (the
Einsatzgruppen case); Theodor Lenckner & Walter Perron, § 176, in Strafgesetzbuch:
Kommentar, margin no. § 35, n.18 (Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder eds., 2001) (noting
that § 35 of the German Penal Code recognizes the availability of duress as a complete de-
fense in form of an excuse). 
104. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, Judgement, IT-96-22-A (Oct. 7, 1997). 
105. See Prosecutor v. Darko Mrdja, IT-02-59-S, (Mar. 31, 2004). 
106. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic´, supra note 104, at para. 8. 
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this case carried all the elements of duress. Here we have a coercer,
Erdemovic´’s commanding ofﬁcer who threatened to kill the accused
Erdemovic´, and the coerced party who chose to accede to the threat.107
Let us now compare the Erdemovic´ case with the Mrdja case.108 Darko
Mrdja was charged with acting in concert with others in the killing of over
two hundred men as war crimes and crimes against humanity.109 In re-
sponse to these charges, the defense submitted that the accused acted under
the duress of his superiors’ orders and that, if he had not carried them out,
he would have suffered “serious consequences.”110 In addition, it empha-
sized that Mrdja was a “low-ranking member of the Intervention Platoon”
who was subjected to the constant anti-Muslim brainwashing and hate
propaganda of his superiors.”111 The defense accordingly submitted that,
“[a]lthough, without any doubt, he had the legal and moral obligation to
oppose the order given to him and the other members of the Platoon,
[Mrdja] had neither the intellectual nor personal ability to do so.” In sup-
port of its submissions, the defense referred to the Erdemovic´  Sentencing
Judgment and the case law of the German Supreme Court, which ac-
knowledged that duress is in some circumstances a mitigating factor. The
defense additionally relied upon Mrdja’s oral statements. For instance, at
the hearing, Mrdja said that he would have been killed if he had not car-
ried out his superiors’ orders. The defense also referred to Professor
Gallwitz’s Report, which concluded that “Darko Mrdja acted in a way
of reduced self-control caused by acute stress or in a normal emotional 
reaction, with age, indoctrination, increased brutality, obedience, group-
conforming conduct reducing the ability of independent thinking.”112
Finally, the defense argued that the fact that Mrdja acted pursuant to his
superiors’ orders was a reason, in addition to the duress he experienced, to
mitigate punishment in accordance with Article 7(4) of the Statute. 
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107. For a discussion of duress in the context of the Erdemovic´ case, see, e.g., P. Rowe,
supra note 61, at 210. Duress has been described as an excuse best explained by the unfair
opportunity branch of the choice theory of excuse; see, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Reﬂections
on Excusing Wrongdoers, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671, 710 (1988) (“Duress is a no-fair-opportunity
excuse.”).
108. See Prosecutor v. Darko Mrdja, supra note 105.
109. See ibid. 
110. See ibid, para. 59.
111. See ibid, para. 59.
112. See ibid, para. 61.
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The prosecution responded by drawing the Trial Chamber’s attention
to the facts of the Erdemovic´ case, which in its words “were different from
the present case because Erdemovic´ expressly refused to comply with his
superior’s orders, was threatened with execution, and only then committed
the crimes.”113 Thus the issue was whether duress could emanate from sub-
tler psychological coercion as opposed to physical coercion.114 The Trial
Chamber seemed to have been of the opinion that the concept of duress
is limited to only physical coercion and, therefore, that psychological co-
ercion was insufﬁcient to effectuate duress, as is evident in its statement:
“The Trial Chamber is not persuaded on the basis of this evidence that
Darko Mrdja indeed acted under threat. . . . The absence of any convinc-
ing evidence of any meaningful sign that Darko Mrdja wanted to dissoci-
ate himself from the massacre at the time of its commission prevents the
Trial Chamber from accepting duress as a mitigating circumstance.”115
This viewpoint draws attention to restrictions under classical duress on
the types of coercive threats sufﬁcient to excuse an actor of criminal re-
sponsibility. In this respect, unless the coercer uses deadly force or threat-
ens the accused with death, the accused will be denied duress as a matter
of law.116 Psychological coercion stemming from “indoctrination, in-
creased brutality, obedience, group-conforming conduct” does not satisfy
this legal threshold.117
Another traditional requirement of the duress defense raised in the
prosecution’s argument is that the coercer must either expressly or by im-
plication order the commission of the offense committed by the accused.
A generalized fear of harm of death unconnected with any speciﬁc and
clear demand to commit a crime will not excuse.118 Thus the reality is that,
although some wartime offenders may commit their crimes in the shadow
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113. See ibid, para. 63.
114. See G. Werle, supra note 103, at 145 (“States of psychological coercion are included
only if they threaten imminent serious physical consequences to life or limb.”); see also A.
Esser, supra note 70, at marginal no. 29.
115. See Prosecutor v. Darko Mrdja, supra note 105, at para. 66.
116. See G. Werle, supra note 103, at 145.
117. Yet see, e.g., Philip G. Zimbardo, The Human Choice, in Nebraska Symposium on
Motivation, 1969, 237–307 (William J. Arnold & David Levine eds., 1970) (on an experiment
demonstrating that deindividuation is more inﬂuential when individuals are in uniform). 
118. See Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope, 56 Ohio
St. L.J. 665 (1995) (for an interesting discussion on coercive threats). 
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of indoctrination, increased brutality, obedience, and group conform-
ity,119 unless they can connect their crimes to a clear demand, their claim
of duress will likely fail. Yet Pavlov’s groundbreaking research on condi-
tional reﬂexes120 informs us that human beings may respond in a desired
manner if they are conditioned by verbal or other symbols used in prop-
aganda—in other words, a form of duress by mental coercion or coercive
persuasion.121
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119. Although the defense of duress focuses on proximal cognitive antecedents, distal
cognitive antecedents also inﬂuence the commission of atrocities. In the case of the latter,
the My-Lai incident in the Vietnam war is a case in point. Distal risk factors emanating
from years of military training and culture affected the cognitive ability of perpetrators to
distinguish between right and wrong. For instance, it appears that Lieutenant Colonel
Barker, who was the commanding ofﬁcer for the task force of which the now-infamous
Charlie Company was a part, did not issue any order for the killing of unarmed civilians;
nevertheless, in the light of the factors such as the demand for more aggression on the part
of American soldiers, the intelligence information portraying a community who were
allied to the Viet Cong, the uncorroborated assumption that civilians would be “gone to
market,” and the fact that the guerrillas commonly disguised themselves as Vietnamese
peasants, to mention but a few, the overall conclusion was that a free-fire zone had in
effect been created. Thus no one would be sparred from attacks—everyone was lawful
target—all should be eliminated. As stated in the Peers Commission Report on the mas-
sacre: “it seems reasonable to conclude that LTC Barker’s minimal or nonexistent instruc-
tions concerning the handling of noncombatants created the potential for grave
misunderstandings as to his intentions and for the interpretation of his orders as authority
to ﬁre, without restriction, on all persons found in the target area.” See Michael Bilton &
Kevin Sim, Four Hours in My Lai, 96 (1971); see also Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-
Sociological Theory, 29 (2008) (pointing out that “military organisation is the easiest place
to trace the social techniques for overcoming our biological propensity not to be violent”).
See Herbert C. Kelman, Violence without Moral Restrains, 29 J. Soc. Issues, 26–61, 39
(maintaining that “when acts of violence are explicitly ordered, implicitly encouraged, tac-
itly approved, or at least permitted by legitimate authorities, people’s readiness to commit
or condone them is considerably enhanced”).
120. See Ivan P. Pavlov, Conditioned Reﬂexes (Gleb von Anrep trans., ed., 1927). Others
who have been inspired by Pavlov in their research on brainwashing and propaganda in-
clude Serge Chakhotin, The Rape of the Masses; The Psychology of Totalitarian Political
Propaganda (1940); and Joost A.M. Meerlo, The Rape of the Mind (1956). 
121. See Decision on the Conﬁrmation of Charges, Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui
(ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Sept. 30, 2008 (“An alternative means by which
a leader secures automatic compliance via his control of the apparatus may be through in-
tensive, strict and violent training regimes. For example, abducting minors and subject-
ing them to punishing training regimens in which they are taught to shoot, pillage, rape
and kill, may be an effective means for automatic compliance with leaders’ orders to com-
mit such acts.”).
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These viewpoints also draw attention to the issue of inescapability in
duress cases: that is, the traditional requirement that a defendant reason-
ably believe that committing the crime was the only way to avoid threat-
ened danger.122 The accused cannot claim duress if he had any reasonable
opportunity to extricate himself from the coercive situation without com-
mitting the crime, either by resisting the coercer or by escaping.123 The fol-
lowing comments by Dienstag shed light on the notion of inescapability
in the context of international criminal law:
Unlike the criminal defendant, who can claim the operation of duress for
the entire period of his action, a war crime participant will often have var-
ious opportunities to evade the threatened injury . . . he is likely to be
armed and allowed periodic leave for off-camp visits. Even if the ordinary
coerced actor will not be deterred by the knowledge that he will later be
held accountable, deterrence may work on the war criminal as an impetus
to escape efforts. To be sure, the soldier who deserts to avoid complicity in
murder runs the substantial risk that he will be found and executed. But a
substantial risk is not a certainty, and the percentage difference leaves theo-
retical room for the deterrence aspect of the law to operate. Of course, the
law could allow a duress defense to be presented and let the trier of fact de-
cide whether the probabilities were such that the defendant should have at-
tempted escape. The likelihood that escape opportunities will exist,
however, calls for a rule that will spur the actor to escape attempts rather
than encourage him complacently to rely on an apparent excuse and com-
mit the ordered crimes. A Hobbesian calculation here requires the stricter
standard.124
It is submitted, however, that Dienstag ignores the social, economic, and
psychological barriers that prevent those who kill in time of war from resist-
ing or escaping. Psychologically, when indoctrination and hate propaganda
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122. See generally L. K. Dore, supra note 118, at 665. 
123. Yet “[p]sychologists have known for some time that many cognitive processes are
beyond conscious awareness or voluntary control”; see Nicholas Epley & Thomas
Gilovich, Just Going Along: Nonconscious Priming and Conformity to Social Pressure, 35
J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 578–89, 579 (1999). For a review of relevant literature, see
generally Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition, 102
Psychol. Rev. 4–27 (1995).
124. See Abbe L. Dienstag, Fedorenko v. United States, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 120, 148–49
(1982). See Aaron Fichtelberg, Liberal Values in International Criminal Law, 6(1) J. Int’l
Crim. Just. 14 (2008) (making a similar point in relation to the Erdemovic´ case).
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extend over an appreciable period of time, some wartime offenders may
ﬁnd themselves as virtual prisoners.125
Equally from a social and economic context, the following statement by
Brooks in relation to the Erdemovic´ case gives us some insight into the ob-
stacles faced by wartime offenders:
By all accounts, Drazen Erdemovic´ was an accidental and unwilling soldier,
not a mercenary. He came from a paciﬁst, cosmopolitan background, and
grew up with friends of many different ethnicities. He opposed the war,
and did not wish to ﬁght; when he left the Croatian Defense Force, he
sought work as a locksmith. He eventually married a Serbian woman he
had known since childhood, and the young couple drifted around Serbia
for a time, trying to ﬁnd work and a place where a multi-ethnic family
could live unmolested. They considered leaving the Balkans altogether, and
tried to get visas to Switzerland, but papers were difﬁcult to obtain. Finally,
with his wife pregnant and his savings almost gone, Erdemovic´ turned to
one of the few remaining sources of steady employment in the region, and
in 1994 he enlisted once more, this time in the Bosnian Serb Army of
Radovan Karadzic’s self-proclaimed “Republica Srpska,” the Serb enclave
within Bosnia.126
EXCUSE AN D M IT IGATION | 57
125. See Penny Powers, Persuasion and Coercion, 19(2) HEC Forum 139 (June 2007)
(citing Lerbinger, “coercion might occur unconsciously over long periods of time by the
creation of a populace who lacks knowledge of persuasive strategies, exists in a media world
of ‘pseudo-events’ and craves approval and pleasure instead of ‘truth from reason’. . . .
Social science must be held accountable for its role in creating and exploiting dependent
groups of people.”). 
126. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity & Duress, 43
Va. J. Int’l L. 861, 863–64 (2003); see also Stephen C. Newman, Duress as a Defense to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 166 Mil. L. Rev. 160 (2000) (agreeing with
Ehrenreich’s account). What these authors are in effect alluding to is the problem of moral
luck—under this theory it is assumed that individuals commit criminal acts wholly or
partly as a result of things outside of their control. “It is not that they were compelled to
do them by overwhelming force, but that background factors came together so that they
made a particular choice which if things had been different they would not have made”;
see Phillip Cole, The Myth of Evil: Demonizing the Enemy 146 (2006); see also Tony
Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 L.Q. Rev. 530 (1988), (examining the problem of
moral luck). Of relevance also is the following question posed by Solzhenitsyn: “So as to
not clothe oneself too quickly in the immaculate tunic of the just, each of us must ask our-
selves: and had my life taken a different turn, would not I, too, have become one of the
executioners?”; cited by Pierre Moutin & Marc Schweitzer, Les crimes contre l’humanité
du silence à la parole 30 (1994). 
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Brook’s statement above demonstrates how people caught up in the
maelstrom of war are subject to social pressures that induce them to join in
criminal activity despite restrictions on their freedom that tangibly limit
their ability to escape. It may therefore be the case that they did not wil-
fully place themselves in a position where the causal nexus pointed toward
the likelihood of committing international crimes. Ultimately the above
discussion on duress draws attention to the following issue: For the purpose
of evaluating duress claims, should war crime defendants be treated as a cat-
egory of person whom the fact ﬁnder might think less able to resist pres-
sure than people not within that category? Or should they be treated in a
similar fashion as ordinary defendants under domestic criminal law?
D. Mistake of Fact (full excuse) and Provocation (partial excuse)
Mistake of fact and provocation have been dealt with differently under
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In the case of a
mistake of fact defense, Article 32 of the Rome Statute states inter alia
that a “mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsi-
bility only if it negates the mental element required by law.”127 This stip-
ulation suggests that if, for example, A ﬁres at an unarmed civilian B,
whilst mistakenly but reasonably believing that B was an armed enemy
soldier, this would be deemed as negating the requisite mens rea for A’s
attack, thereby resulting in the possibility of an acquittal.128 On the other
hand, in relation to a provocation defense, Article 31(1)(a) of the Rome
Statute (under “Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility”) states
that a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that per-
son’s conduct, he or she “suffers from a mental disease or defect that de-
stroys that person’s capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of
his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform
to the requirements of law.”129
Clearly by requiring extreme abnormality in the form of the destruc-
tion of one’s capacity as a basis for a loss of self-control, this provision
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127. See The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) (hereinafter ICC Statute).
128. For other examples, see Albin Eser, Mental Elements—Mistake of Fact and
Mistake of Law, in A. Cassese, supra note 20, at 938.
129. See ICC Statute, Art. 31(1)(a).
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rules out any possibility of pleading provocation.130 It therefore appears nar-
rower131 than Rule 67(A)(ii)(b) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Rule
67(A)(ii)(b) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure, which state verbatim that: 
As early as reasonably practicable and in any event prior to the commence-
ment of the trial . . . the defence shall notify the Prosecutor of its intent to
offer: . . . (b) Any special defence, including that of diminished or lack of
mental responsibility; in which case the notiﬁcation shall specify the names
and addresses of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused
intends to rely to establish the special defence.132
In the light of this, one wonders how the Rome Statute intends to deal
with an accused who acted honestly, although mistakenly, in the face of
perceived provocation?133 Would the accused be acquitted on the grounds
of mistake of fact?134 Or would the case be characterized as one involving
provocation, and thereby resulting in a full conviction?135 Any response at
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130. See Peter Krug, supra note 26, at 332 (“The use of ‘destroys’ may, that is, be taken
as signalling the rejection of the notion of reduced capacity. The answer to this question
awaits the anticipated ICC’s construction of the Statute. In this author’s opinion, however,
it is unlikely that the drafters of the Statute intended to bar the Court from using mental
condition as a mitigating factor. There is a clear grant of discretion in the Statute’s sen-
tencing provisions, and there is no explicit prohibition of mitigation in Article 31(1)(a).”);
see also S. Janssen, Mental Condition Defences in Supranational Criminal Law, 4 Int’l
Crim. L. Rev. 84 (2004). 
131. Albin Eser, supra note 70, 875 (“At any rate, however, the level of incapacity must
still remain above mere diminished menal capacity; . . . the Statute does not provide a (par-
tial) defence of ‘diminished criminal responsibility’.”). 
132. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32, adopted on Feb. 11, 1994, 67 (A)(ii)(b); International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1
(1995), entered into force 29 June 1995, 67 (A)(ii)(b).
133. See the contrasting views of Fletcher and Yeo on this issue as detailed in Partial
Excuses to Murder 20–21 (Stanley M.H. Yeo ed., 1991) (Fletcher disagrees with the notion
of mistaken provocation; Yeo in contrast supports the notion.).
134. See G. Werle, supra note 103, at 151 n.346 (“Under civil law doctrine e.g., German
law, a mistake about the factual requirements of a ground for excluding criminal responsi-
bility (Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum) may also exclude criminal responsibility.); see also Hans-
Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allgemeiner Teil, 490,
464–67 (5th ed. 1996). 
135. It appears that this latter scenario is more likely to occur. See G. Werle, supra note 103,
at 151 (“[I]f the perpetrator, for example erroneously assumes that a prisoner of war is reaching
into his pocket to pull a weapon, and he therefore shoots him, no grounds for excluding 
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this stage would understandably be premature.136 However, even under
statutory regimes that recognize both categories of excuse defenses, the
overlap between mistake of fact and provocation has led to inconsistencies
in the treatment of defendants. 
Two cases illustrate this problem, Regina v. Finta137 and Prosecutor v.
Tadic´.138 In the former case, the accused charges related to events during
World War II when, as a Hungarian gendarmerie captain, he was alleged
to have committed various offenses under the heading of war crimes and
crimes against humanity (such as conﬁnement, imprisonment, and rob-
bery) against many Jewish people in the ghetto of Szeged, one of the
largest provincial cities of Hungary.139 In the Tadic´ case, allegations of war
crimes and crimes against humanity pertained to the accused’s involve-
ment in attacks in the town of Kozarac, which is about ten kilometers fur-
ther east of Prijedor, the second largest town in Republika Srpska after
Banja Luka and the center of a massive propaganda campaign. In the
course of the attack on Kozarac, much of the non-Serbian population of
the city was led away to the camps of Omarska, Keraterm, and Trnopolje,
where they were subjected to further suffering. Tadic´ was inter alia accused
of partaking in ill-treatment in the camps, particularly the Omarska camp,
the most notorious of all three.140 Finta and Tadic´ both blamed their ac-
tions on the prevailing propaganda campaign, which portrayed Jewish
people and non-Serbs, respectively, as enemies. Each claimed he genuinely
acted to avert danger. 
In the Finta judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court recognized the
possibility that a wartime situation could cause the commission of honest
but mistaken acts in the face of perceived provocation, as is evident in the
following statements: “[T]he crime itself must be considered in context.
Such crimes are usually committed during a time of war. Wars are con-
cerned with death and destruction. Sweet reason is often among the ﬁrst
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responsibility due to mistake of fact under Article 32(1) of the ICC Statute are available. Here,
however, it may be argued that this unsatisfying result should be corrected. . . .”).
136. See S. Yeo, supra note 133, at 92 (“The common law experience of mistake about the
provocation itself is slender and appears to be restricted to error induced by drunkenness.”). 
137. See Regina v. Imre Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701, Supreme Court of Canada (Mar. 24,
1994).
138. See Dusko Tadic´, Sentencing Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-T (July 14, 1997). 
139. See Regina v. Imre Finta, supra note 137.
140. See Dusko Tadic´, supra note 138.
NCLR1301_02.qxd   2/15/10  3:50 AM  Page 60
This content downloaded from 144.124.180.191 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 08:10:54 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
victims. The manipulation of emotions, often by the dissemination of
false information and propaganda, is part and parcel of the terrible tapes-
try of war. False information and slanted reporting is so predominant that
it cannot be automatically assumed that persons in units such as the
Gendarmerie would really know that they were part of a plot to extermi-
nate an entire race of people.”141 Similarly in the Tadic´ case, a link between
wartime propaganda and the commission of mistaken acts in the face of per-
ceived provocation could be said to have been implicitly recognized by the
Trial Chamber when it stated: “[T]he virulent propaganda that stoked the
passions of the citizenry in Opstina Prijedor was endemic and contributed
to the crimes committed in the conﬂict and, as such, has been taken into ac-
count in the sentences imposed on Dusko Tadic. As two writers have noted:
When victims are dehumanized . . . the moral restraints against killing or
harming them become less effective. Groups of people who are systemati-
cally demonized, assigned to inferior or dangerous categories, and identiﬁed
by derogatory labels are readily excluded from the bonds of human empa-
thy and the protection of moral and legal precepts.”142
The impression given in these statements was that Finta and Tadic´ were
both acting on a false view of events deliberately induced by the Nazis and
by Serbian leaders, respectively. However, despite similar ﬁndings, the out-
comes of both cases were fundamentally different. Finta’s defense was inter
alia treated as falling under mistake of fact defense and resulted in an ac-
quittal; whereas Tadic´’s conduct appeared to have been grouped under a
provocation defense, and Tadic´ was sentenced to twenty years imprison-
ment for his crimes. Two radical outcomes resulting out of essentially
identical situations.143 Why the discrepancy? Finally, a comparison of the
Finta and Tadic´ cases reveals inconsistencies and a lack of uniformity vis-
à-vis the relationship between provocation and mistake of fact under in-
ternational criminal law.
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141. See Regina v. Imre Finta, supra note 137, at para. 816; see also Jose E. Alvarez,
Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 365, 427–28 (1999).
142. See Dusko Tadic´, supra note 138, at para. 72. 
143. See S. Yeo, supra note 133, at 93 (similarly expressing puzzlement with the state
of affairs between mistaken self-defense and mistaken provocation albeit in the domes-
tic context, he writes, “Juries might think it odd that the law’s measure of self-defence
under mistaken belief (which may lead to a full acquittal) is less demanding of the
accused than that which may result in a mere reduction, by provocation, of murder to
manslaughter.”). 
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I I I .  M I N I M I Z I NG OVE R LAPS,  CLOS I NG GAPS,  
AN D R E SOLVI NG AM B IG U ITI E S
Section I involved identifying the reasons for current defects in the con-
cepts of excuse and mitigation under international criminal law. Section II
analyzed these defects. The ﬁnal section now attempts to address these
problematic issues. 
A. Excuse Defenses and Mitigating Circumstances: 
A Conceptual Separation 
Previously it was demonstrated that overlaps currently exist between ex-
cuse and mitigating circumstances under international criminal law. The
confusion of factors exclusively relating to the offender with those exclu-
sively relating to the offense will ultimately erode the distinction between
excuse and mitigation. Bearing this in mind, this section attempts to re-
draw both the boundaries between excuse and mitigating circumstances
and the boundaries between different categories of mitigating circum-
stances. To facilitate this process, this section will establish a bifurcated
framework for evaluating excuse and mitigating circumstances. Two con-
ceptual parts can be distinguished: the ﬁrst, “Culpability Reduction
Factors,” are those related to the crime and which establish that the ac-
cused demonstrated less culpability vis-à-vis the crime; the second,
“Positive and Veriﬁable Personal Circumstance Factors,” are mitigating
circumstances unrelated to the crime but which portray the defendant in
a good light and are veriﬁable. 
Already divisions along similar lines exist under domestic law. For in-
stance, the English Law Commission144 has proposed a clear distinction
between the two sets of characteristics. In its consultation paper, duress,
indirect or forced participation, and diminished responsibility are charac-
terized as “mitigating factors” that may be relevant to the offense of mur-
der. The full list includes: 
(a) an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill, 
(b) lack of premeditation, 
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  13 | NO.  1 | WI NTE R 201062
144. See Law Commission, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales, Consultation
Paper No. 177, http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/cp177_web.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
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(c) the fact that the offender suffered from any mental disorder or mental
disability which (although not falling within section 2(1) of the
Homicide Act 1957 (c. 11)), lowered his degree of culpability, 
(d) the fact that the offender was provoked (for example, by prolonged
stress) in a way not amounting to a defence of provocation, 
(e) the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence, 
(f ) a belief by the offender that the murder was an act of mercy, and 
(g) the age of the offender.145
On the other hand, expression of remorse, good character with no prior
criminal conviction, and postconﬂict conduct are categorized under “personal
mitigation,” that is, factors that reduce the severity of a sentence, and re-
late to the offender rather than to the offense.146 Finally, the forthcoming
subsections present a more in-depth discussion of the proposed bifurcated
framework for evaluating excuse and mitigating circumstances. 
1. Culpability Reduction Factors
Arguably, the biggest obstacle for culpability reduction is the set of pecu-
liarities that may pertain to international crimes.147 As stated in the Kupreskic´
case: “Unlike provisions of national criminal codes or, in common-law coun-
tries, rules of criminal law crystallised in the relevant case-law or found
in statutory enactments, each Article of the Statute does not confine it-
self to indicating a single category of well-defined acts such as murder,
voluntary or involuntary manslaughter, theft, etc. Instead the Articles
embrace broad clusters of offences sharing certain general legal ingredi-
ents . . . some provisions have such a broad scope that they may overlap.
. . . Other acts or transactions may only be defined as crimes against
humanity (Article 5).”148
It follows that, since it is impossible to talk of speciﬁc and basic intent
crimes under international criminal law for the purpose of extenuating
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145. See ibid. 
146. See ibid. 
147. See P. Krug, supra note 26, at 331 (arriving at a similar conclusion). See Andrew
von Hirsch & Jareborg Nils, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 19–21 (1991) (on developing principles by which the relative seri-
ousness of different crimes under domestic law may be assessed). 
148. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic´ et al., IT-95-16-T, paras. 697–98 (Jan. 14, 2000).
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criminal responsibility, this section makes a proposal for special verdicts149
of crimes against humanity by reason of provocation, or crimes against hu-
manity by reason of diminished responsibility, or genocide by reason of
duress, or war crimes by reason of provocation.150 This proposal would not
require amendments to ICL statutes; rather it would involve judges rec-
ognizing this aspect in their sentencing judgments. Thus although both a
crime against humanity and a crime against humanity by reason of provo-
cation will result in the same act, there is clearly a difference in the level
of culpability between both crimes that should be reﬂected in different
sentencing outcomes. A crime against humanity by reason of provocation
carries with it a lesser degree of blameworthiness and condemnation than
the term “crime against humanity” alone would imply. The current ap-
proach of merely imposing a lower sentence for a crime against humanity,
absent of any explanation of culpability differences in the commission of
such crimes, makes the international criminal justice system appear erratic.
It also reduces global conﬁdence in the international criminal justice sys-
tem as a whole when, on the face of it, people who appear to be cold-
blooded killers are giving lenient treatment. Finally, there is also the risk
that a sentence for a defendant suffering from mental impairment at the
time of his crime may increase if the defendant is sentenced for genocide,
war crimes, or crimes against humanity instead of any of these by reason
of a partial excuse. 
2. Relevant Personal Circumstance Factors 
Under this heading two categories of circumstances can be identiﬁed: the
ﬁrst is relevant personal circumstances, whilst the second can be described
as irrelevant personal circumstances. Relevant personal circumstances in-
clude voluntary surrender, assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of
another war criminal, and postconflict conduct of the accused.
Furthermore, the value of being able to verify genuine instances of posi-
tive personal circumstances for the purpose of sentencing is, for example,
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149. See P. Krug, supra note 26, at 331 (“If the international prosecution system is to
function effectively under the English variant, lesser included offenses will have to be
found within one or more of the core crimes. . . .”).
150. This proposal draws inspiration from the following document: Sentencing
Guidelines Council, Manslaughter by Reason of Provocation (Nov. 2005). 
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illustrated by the attempts of one of the accused in the Kvocka et al. judg-
ment,151 Zigic´, to mitigate his sentence on the basis of voluntarily surren-
dering. In the Kvocka et al. judgment, Zigic´ argued that his surrender to
the Tribunal while in prison in Banja Luka should be considered as a mit-
igating factor 152 because the authorities of the Republika Srpska would not
have extradited him to the Tribunal had he not taken the initiative to sur-
render. In response, the Trial Chamber, although acknowledging that vol-
untary surrender may constitute a mitigating circumstance, nevertheless
ruled out Zigic´’s act as constituting voluntary surrender.153 Key to its ﬁnd-
ing was the fact that Zigic´ was already imprisoned in Banja Luka at the
time of his surrender to the Tribunal, raising the issue of whether, in the
light of Zigic´’s incarcerated state, his surrender really could be described
as voluntary. Zigic´’s main argument in this respect was that, without his
consent, the authorities of Republika Srpska would not have extradited
him to the Tribunal, and therefore that the general lack of cooperation be-
tween the authorities of Republika Srpska and the Tribunal around the
time of his incarceration had the effect of transforming his incarceration
and subsequent extradition into a voluntary surrender. 
The Appeals Chamber sided with the accused154 and was heavily inﬂu-
enced in this respect by the approach taken by the Trial Chamber in the
Simic´ case.155 In that case poor relations between the ICTY and the
Republika Srpska were crucial to the accused’s successful plea of voluntary
surrender as a mitigating factor. In the Zigic´ case, the Appeals Chamber
noted that Zigic´’s surrender to the Tribunal took place only some two
months later than Milan Simic´’s surrender. Therefore, the Appeals Chamber
found that the Trial Chamber committed an error when it declined to con-
sider Zigic´’s voluntary surrender to the Tribunal as a mitigating factor.156
Further illustrating issues of relevance and veriﬁability in relation to
voluntary surrender is the contrasting decision in the Deronjic´ case.157 In
attempting to reduce the sentence, part of the defense strategy was to rely
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151. See Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A (July 8, 2002).





157. See Prosecutor v. Miroslav Deronjic´, Case No. IT-02-61-S, paras. 265–67 (Mar. 30,
2004).
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on a plea of voluntary surrender. Its rationale for relying on this plea was
that voluntary surrender is a mitigating factor that “may inspire other in-
dictees to similarly surrender themselves, thus enhancing the effectiveness
of the work of the Tribunal.”158 It argued that because the accused was ar-
rested in front of his home less than seventy-two hours from the moment
the indictment against him had been issued, and before he was even aware
that the indictment against him existed, he was deprived of the opportu-
nity to surrender voluntarily and thereby receive credit for it.159 The de-
fense further contended that, in his interview with the prosecution given
as a suspect, the accused had expressed his willingness and readiness to
come voluntarily to the Hague and face charges against him. As evidence
of his genuine intention to voluntary surrender, the defense asserted that
Deronjic´ not only complied with the summons of the prosecution to be in-
terviewed by the investigators but also expressed his willingness to appear
voluntarily whenever so requested.160
All of the above was meant to establish that the accused had been willing
to surrender voluntarily and therefore that his intention to surrender should
be considered as a mitigating factor. However, the Trial Chamber in re-
sponse rejected this plea, stating that it was impossible to ascertain whether
or not the accused genuinely intended to surrender voluntarily.161 It cited the
conclusions reached by the Trial Chamber in Obrenovic´: “[S]ince the Trial
Chamber would have to speculate in order to determine whether Dragan
Obrenovic´ would in fact have voluntarily surrendered if given the opportu-
nity, the Trial Chamber attached little weight to this factor.”162
Both cases highlight the value of relevant and veriﬁable evidence at the
penalty phase of war crime trials. On the other hand, in terms of irrele-
vant personal circumstances, they include most notably character and
youth.163 For instance, in terms of character evidence under international
criminal law, two types of character evidence can be identiﬁed: the ac-
cused’s character before the war and the accused’s character during the






163. See Jennifer J. Clark, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 Geo. L.J. 1685, 1694 (2008)
(commenting on the unreliability of youth as a sentencing factor). 
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war. It is unfortunate that both are sometimes given the same weight. The
Cesic´ case164 shall be used to illustrate this point. In the Cesic´ judgment,
the defense referred to statements from ten non-Serb character witnesses
who gave the following examples about the character of the accused that
related to his conduct during the war: 
(i) Stopping soldiers maltreating some Muslims; 
(ii) Supplying food; 
(iii) Saving men from being killed at Luka Camp by taking them to their
homes; 
. . .
(vi) Protecting neighbours by placing a piece of paper at the entrance door
certifying, under his name, that their building had been “cleared” and
did not need to be searched again; . . .165
On the other hand, the prosecution presented evidence unrelated to the
war “to prove that Ranko Cesic´ has been previously convicted for a crim-
inal offence.”166 Fortunately the Trial Chamber found that the evidence
submitted by the prosecution did not successfully rebut the evidence ad-
duced by the defense in support of its claim of good character. 
Nevertheless it should be emphasized that the consideration of charac-
ter evidence unrelated to the war alongside character evidence directly re-
lated to the war is inappropriate167 since the former type of evidence has
no intrinsic connection to the crimes committed.168 The following hypo-
thetical emphasizes the perverse consequences of treating both types of
character evidence in the same fashion. Imagine that two soldiers W and Y
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164. See Prosecutor v. Cesic´, supra note 51.
165. See ibid., paras. 67–87. 
166. See ibid., paras. 67–87.
167. See J.J. Clark, supra note 163 (“[D]efendants frequently argue that evidence of
good character prior to the conﬂict should mitigate their sentences. The Trial Chamber’s
responses to this evidence vary widely. Sometimes they view prior good character as a mit-
igating factor, but sometimes they give it only limited weight. Still other times they refuse
to consider good character altogether, and on occasion they ﬁnd that prior good character
aggravates, rather than mitigates, the appropriate punishment.”). 
168. See G. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 491 (“[G]uilt, culpability and blameworthiness . . .
do not raise questions of the actor’s general moral worth or even of his moral wickedness
in a particular situation. They pinpoint the speciﬁc inquiry into whether it is fair to hold
the actor accountable for an act of legal wrongdoing.”).
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are alleged to have committed crimes in the context of an armed conﬂict.
W is able to point to instances of merciful conduct vis-à-vis enemy de-
tainees, but Y was thoroughly merciless at all times during the war.
However, there is evidence to suggest that prior to the war, W was a racist
individual but Y was very tolerant. To what extent should this past evi-
dence be deemed as relevant to the appropriate amount of blame that
should be attached to the present crimes of W and Y? 
The answer is that such evidence is irrelevant to the attribution of
blame vis-à-vis the current crimes committed by both of the accused.169 In
fact a similar position was adopted in the Kupreskic´ case170 where the Trial
Chamber held that, in general, evidence of the good character of the ac-
cused prior to the commission of the alleged crimes rarely has probative
value since, by their very nature, the alleged crimes may be committed by
persons without a criminal record or a history of violence.171 Furthermore,
it noted that, as a general principle of criminal law, such evidence is gen-
erally inadmissible as a demonstration of the accused’s propensity to act
accordingly.172 It follows that the decision of whether or not to use char-
acter evidence in mitigation should be limited to only what the accused
did during the war. The accused’s life before the war is of no relevance to
any decision to attribute blame. Finally, when evaluating mitigation for
mass atrocities, no one should care whether an accused is married with
children or single; or whether an accused has a good employment history
or a history of unemployment; or whether the accused converted to reli-
gion or was an atheist; or whether the accused had a deprived childhood
or was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. All of these factors should
be excluded from any decision to mitigate sentence.173
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169. See Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct, 27 Crim. L. Bull.
504, 523 (“The primary justiﬁcation for the exclusion of most character evidence is the fear
that the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs its probative value.”). See also Fed.
R. Evid. 404(a)(1) (stipulating inter alia that evidence of a person’s character or of a char-
acter trait is not admissible to prove that the person acted in conformity with such char-
acter or trait); Victor Tadros, The Characters of Excuse, 21(3) Oxford J. Legal Stud.,
495–519, 502.
170. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic´ et al., Case No. IT-95-16, Decision on Evidence of the
Good Character of the Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque (Feb. 17, 1999). 
171. See ibid. 
172. See ibid.
173. The consideration of unlimited mitigating evidence about the defendant shifts focus
away from the impact of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity on victims. 
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B. Individualized Justice 
The concept of individual criminal responsibility constitutes a bedrock of
the international criminal justice system. Individual criminal responsibil-
ity is essentially “the concept that a person is only culpable to the extent
of his own freewill or guilty mind.”174 Notably it was recognized and ap-
plied by the World War II tribunals and has been adopted by contempo-
rary ICL enforcement agencies.175 However, despite the above, attempts to
inject subjectivity into the guilt phase of ICL proceedings has so far been
unsuccessful, as evident in the analysis in section II. Almost all of the cases
examined above reveal that the reasonableness of the accused’s conduct
was viewed hyper-objectively176 and therefore that limited attention was
giving to the peculiar situation or the peculiar characteristics of each of the
accused.177 Rather than asking how a defendant faced with the same situ-
ation and sharing the same characteristics as Banovic´, Lanzo, or Mrdja178
would have reacted, there was a tendency to ask how a reasonable per-
son would have reacted in this situation.179 Therefore, one problem with
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174. See Lafave & Scott, supra note 19. 
175. See Henry T. King Jr., Robert Jackson’s Vision for the Justice and Other
Reﬂections of a Nüremberg Prosecutor, 88 Geo. L.J. 2421 (Aug. 2000) (emphasizing the
centrality of individual criminal responsibility as part of Robert Jackson’s vision).
176. Employing an objective test is, however, problematic and creates a misunderstand-
ing of the situation in that a reasonable person does not commit genocide or crimes against
humanity; see Morse, supra note 73, at 33 (“Reasonable people do not kill no matter how
much they are provoked, and even enraged people generally retain the capacity to control
homicidal or any other kind of aggressive or antisocial desires.” (footnote omitted).); see also
Model Penal Code § 210.3 cmt. at 56 (1980) (A reasonable person does not kill.).
177. See, e.g., Stephanie M. Wildman & Dolores A. Donovan, Is the Reasonable Man
Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self Defence and Provocation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
465–68 (1981) (maintaining that an objective test fails to reﬂect accurately the circum-
stances of a defendant and instead advocates reliance on a subjective test). 
178. See ibid., 459 (“[T]he question of attribution is to be viewed in light of all relevant
facts and circumstances of the individual case.”).
179. In the context of domestic law, support for an objective test is evident in the fol-
lowing: Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1293, 1302
(1986) (“To maintain [social] order, it has been argued, societies must lay down a body of
positive law that compels the obedience of all regardless of individual notions of morality:
if each person were required to adhere to the law only to the extent that it was consistent
with her own values, societies would tend toward anarchy.”). Kevin J. Heller, Beyond the
Reasonable Man?, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 9 (1998) (“Subjective standards of reasonableness
are irreconcilable with the Rule of Law, in this view, because such standards necessarily take
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applying a universal standard of reasonableness to the context of interna-
tional criminal law is that, unlike ordinary criminals who violate social
norms by committing crimes, individuals who are swept up in mass vio-
lence do not step outside the prevailing moral framework.180 It follows that
this is not merely a case of people living in a bad neighborhood who have
succumbed to strong and malignant peer group inﬂuence.181 Rather it is
one of whole or entire societies operating according to their own system of
morality at a particular time.182 It may be that in such societies, a number
of people were genuinely made to believe that they were acting in self-
defense to protect their families and homes from injury, death, or destruc-
tion. In this respect Tallgren made the following relevant statement:
Contrary to most national criminality which is understood to constitute so-
cial deviation, acts addressed as international crimes can, in some circum-
stances, be constituted in terms of conforming to a norm. As a result, the
refusal to commit such acts could be considered as socially deviating be-
haviour. Examples are not too difﬁcult to ﬁnd: the same chain of events can
be described and evaluated from different points of view, as justiﬁed civil
disobedience/internal disturbance, followed by more human rights ac-
tivism/rebellion, followed by promotion of national liberation/terrorism,
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into account ‘the inﬁnite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which make
the internal character of a given act so different in different men’,” quoting Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr., The Common Law, 108 (1938).).
180. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil Ordinary Crime, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts.
J. 39, 59. 
181. For relevant literature, see Richard Delgado, Rotten Social Background, 3 Law and
Inequality 9 (arguing for a recognition of the relationship between socioeconomic status
and criminal behavior). See also David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49
S. Cal. L. Rev. 385 (1976); Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless, 39 UCLA L.
Rev. 1511 (1992); Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, 7 Soc. Phil. & Pol’y
59 (Spring 1990). For contrasting opinions, see Fletcher, supra note 15, at 810 (“It may be
the case that all human conduct is compelled by circumstances, but if it is, we should aban-
don the whole process of blame and punishment and turn to other forms of social protec-
tion.”); Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in From Social Justice to Criminal
Justice, 2 (William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000) (concluding, “No convincing
theory suggests that deprived offenders are less morally responsible simply because they are
deprived and therefore deserve excuse or mitigation on that basis alone.”); Michael S.
Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1146–47 (1985).
182. When whole societies operate according to their own system of morality at a par-
ticular time, applying an objective test would be counterproductive since it has the effect
of legitimizing or justifying rather than excusing the conduct of that defendant. 
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followed by retaliation/counter-terrorist action, followed by strengthened
oppression by the majority/self-defence, and so on.183
In addition, a case that illustrates the need for the doctrine of individ-
ualized justice at the trial phase in the ICL context is the German border
guards’ trial. The trial commenced on September 2, 1991, in Berlin, when
prosecutors tried four former border guards who were responsible for
shooting the last group that tried to escape by climbing the Berlin Wall in
February 1989.184 The border guards’ defense was that they were following
orders. But at the ﬁrst border guard trial in June 1991, the judge had as-
serted that, regardless of orders, the defendants had an obligation not to
shoot based on “basic human rights and a higher moral law.”185 The judge
had also asserted that, although the guards had been “at the end of a long
chain of responsibility,” they had transgressed “a basic human right” by
ﬁring at someone whose only crime was attempting to leave the country.186
Kamali made the following relevant comments in relation to the case:
Yet, as Tina Rosenberg writes in her account of the trials, one of the objec-
tives of border guard training was to create unreﬂective obedience and a
“siege mentality.” The East German public viewing the trials was troubled,
as Martha Minow notes, by the court’s failure to acknowledge or understand
the context of the guards’ conduct, such as issues of indoctrination and mil-
itary control, as well as its automatic application of West German moral and
ethical standards to the East German border guards. A further problem with
these trials was that the judges who tried the ﬁrst cases were all from West
Germany. On a practical level, the West German judges often did not know
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183. See I. Tallgren, supra note 2, at 575; H. Arendt, supra note 12, at 291–92 (“Can we
apply the same principle that is applied to a governmental apparatus in which crime and
violence are exceptions and borderline cases to a political order in which crime is legal and
the rule?”); Mark Osiel, Mass Atrocity, Ordinary Evil, and Hannah Arendt: Criminal
Consciousness in Argentina’s Dirty War, (2001) (pointing out that factors such as culture,
propaganda, and “common knowledge” may have bearing on the extent to which unlaw-
fulness is manifest). See also M. Osiel, supra note 33, at 1755 & 1769 nn.13–15 (2005); Mark
A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549–50
(2005); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness 46 (1998).
184. See Maryam Kamali, Accountability for Human Rights Violations: A Comparison
of Transitional Justice in East Germany and South Africa, 40 Colum. J. Transnat’l L.
107–10 (2001).
185. See ibid. 
186. See ibid. 
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enough about the East German system to understand the subtle psycholog-
ical context of the border guards’ attack on their fellow citizens.187
Each of the above opinions points to the fact that the uniqueness of the
ICL context necessitates greater particularity when determining criminal
responsibility. The forthcoming subsections employ a particularizing stan-
dard for evaluating the criminal conduct of war criminals. They lay the
foundation for employing a context-dependent notion of reasonableness
vis-à-vis defendants under international criminal law. This might on oc-
casion replace the reasonable person with the reasonable Hutu, or the rea-
sonable Serb, or the reasonable hate-propaganda-exposed defendant.188
The aim in each of the forthcoming sections is to achieve individualized
justice for defendants who commit crimes in time of war through a more
particularized personal analysis of their conduct. 
1. Mistake of Fact (full excuse) and Provocation (partial excuse)
In the corresponding section above (II.D.), the Finta and Tadic´ cases were
used to illustrate how rigidity between mistake of fact and provocation under
international criminal law has lead to inconsistencies in the attribution of
criminal liability. The proposal in this section is to employ the mistake of
fact defense to protect those who acted honestly, although mistakenly, in
the face of perceived provocation. Of relevance to this discussion is the U.S.
Model Penal Code’s (MPC) extreme mental or emotional disturbance
(EMED) defense, which combines provocation with mistake of fact.189
According to the MPC, for a plea of EMED to succeed, the defendant
must experience “intense feelings” sufﬁcient to cause the loss of control at
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187. See ibid., at 109. 
188. Particularized standards are recognized under domestic law. See, e.g., Regina v.
Muddarubba (Austl., 1956) (unpublished decision), reprinted in Joseph Goldstein, Alan
M. Dershowitz, Richard D. Schwartz, & Richard C. Donnelly, Criminal Law: Theory and
Process 989 (1974) ( The defendant’s tribal community was found to be relevant to his plea
of provocation.); see also R v. Dincer (1983) 1 V.R. 460, 461, 467 (Austl.) (Both the na-
tionality and culture of the defendant were found to be useful in assessing the defendant’s
plea of provocation.).
189. See Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Ofﬁcial Draft and Revised Comments),
Part II, vol. 1, art. 210.3(1)(b), p. 1 (1980). For relevant literature on the mens rea aspect of
the Code, see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Deﬁning Criminal
Liability, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681–83 (1983). 
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the time of the killing. It further requires that the defendant’s emotional
disturbance be based on a “reasonable explanation or excuse” but qualiﬁes
this requirement with the addendum that reasonableness must be deter-
mined from the defendant’s situation under circumstances as he or she be-
lieves them to be.190 According to Dressler, “the Commentary states that
the phrase ‘under the circumstances as he believes them to be’ is meant to
clarify the role of mistake in provocation law.”191
It is therefore worth considering EMED vis-à-vis the World War II case
of Regina v. Finta,192 which brought to the fore the role of mistake in
provocation under international criminal law. In that case, as should be re-
called, the accused was a Hungarian who had been a police ofﬁcer during
Word War II and immigrated to Canada in 1948. He was accused of com-
mitting manslaughter, kidnapping, unlawful conﬁnement, and robbery by
assisting the Nazis in the forced deportation of Jewish people from
Budapest during the Holocaust. In its deliberations, the Canadian Supreme
Court opined that the requisite test for the mental element of crimes
against humanity was a subjective test. Employing this test, the majority
arrived at the conclusion that the accused mistakenly relied on the “gen-
eral, publicly stated belief in newspapers in Hungary that the Jews were
subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of Hungary” and on “the uni-
versal public expression in the newspapers cited by one of the witnesses of
approval of the deportation of Hungarian Jews.”193 On the basis of this line
of reasoning, the accused was acquitted. 
Several issues are raised by the acquittal. One issue is that, by consider-
ing the reasonableness of Finta’s conduct from the viewpoint of a person
in Finta’s situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be, the
Canadian Supreme Court may have inadvertently legitimized racist con-
duct. In this respect, Alvarez along with “Irwin Cotler and other critics of
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190. See Model Penal Code, ibid. (The MPC provides that the “reasonableness of such
explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s sit-
uation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.”). See, e.g., Joshua Dressler,
Understanding Criminal Law § 31.07, [B][2][b][ii], at 531 (3rd ed. 2001) (The MPC for-
mulation is more subjective insofar as it requires that the reasonableness of the explanation
or excuse for the actor’s disturbance be assessed from the viewpoint of a person “in the ac-
tor’s situation.”).
191. See Dressler, supra note 16, at 990. 
192. See Regina v. Imre Finta, supra note 137. 
193. See ibid.
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the controversial Finta decision have argued that the above portions of the
Canadian Supreme Court’s opinion threaten to turn evidence of anti-
Semitism or racism from an element of an international crime into a de-
fense.”194 As stated by Alvarez, “Pursued to its logical end, the result could
be that any ‘lynch mob’ atmosphere could arguably be pleaded as a de-
fense.”195 In his comment on the MPC commentary, Dressler noted that
the word “situation” in the phrase “from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor’s situation” is “designedly ambiguous.”196 Furthermore, according to
him, “the term situation as employed in the commentary is meant to al-
low a jury to consider a defendant’s ‘personal handicaps and some exter-
nal circumstances,’ but there are limits to subjectivization. . . . It is ‘equally
plain that idiosyncratic moral values’—the Commentary gives an example
of an assassin who kills a political leader because he believes it is right to
do so—‘are not part of the actor’s situation. An assassin . . . cannot ask
that he be judged by the standard of a reasonable extremist. Any other re-
sult would undermine the normative message of the criminal law.’”197
Dressler further wrote: “The Commentary concedes that there are many
cases between these extremes—‘matters . . . [not] as integral a part of
moral depravity as a belief in the rightness of killing’—that are better left
to common law resolution.”198
In the light of the above, the question is, Was Finta a racist, or did he
genuinely mistakenly believe that Jewish people posed a threat? There are
two possible answers: on the one hand, his subjective beliefs could be dis-
missed as a false attempt to avoid liability or willful blindness. In this re-
spect, Cotler et al. argued that the Supreme Court erroneously concluded
that Hungarian newspapers spread hate propaganda. They made the fol-
lowing relevant statement:
[T]he Court was misled in its reliance on Finta’s characterization of these
Hungarian newspapers. In particular, the newspapers do not contain one
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194. See Alvarez, supra note 141, at 427.
195. See ibid.
196. See Dressler, supra note 16, at 991.
197. See Dressler, ibid. 
198. See Dressler, ibid. The concerns raised by these scholars pertain to a hypersubjec-
tivism of the reasonable man standard. For criticism of this approach, see, e.g., Cynthia
Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 386 (1996) (“A subjective
standard of reasonableness might also be criticized for allowing people to set their own
standards governing the permissible use of force.”).
NCLR1301_02.qxd   2/15/10  3:51 AM  Page 74
This content downloaded from 144.124.180.191 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 08:10:54 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
word about the “subversiveness” and “disloyalty” of the Jews; indeed, some
do not even mention the war and only one piece makes any reference to
any alleged military danger from the Jews. This article, while published in
a newspaper on April 9, 1944, is not a newspaper “report” but a memoran-
dum written on February 18, 1944 (i.e., one month before the German inva-
sion), by thirty-four right-wing Hungarian Members of Parliament from the
Hungarian Life Party. Rather than purporting to be “an indication of the feel-
ings of the Hungarian people,” the memorandum complains about those el-
ements “working without the slightest hindrance for rehabilitating the Jews
in the eyes of the Hungarian people.” Accordingly, in adopting Finta’s inac-
curate submission that there was “a general publicly-stated belief in newspa-
pers in Hungary that Jews were subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of
Hungary,” Cory, J., may have been misled into believing that, if this were
true, it somehow gave an “air of reality” to a defense of mistaken belief.199
This statement gives the impression that Finta was aware that Jewish
people were innocent of the accusations of “subversiveness” and “disloyalty”
but shut his mind to it. On the other hand, the Canadian Supreme Court
was of the opinion that Finta made an unreasonable mistake of fact in
genuinely believing that Jewish people posed a threat to Hungary. From
the Supreme Court’s perspective, Finta would not be equivalent to the as-
sassin in the MPC example because his reason for committing crimes
against Jewish people was not an idiosyncratic one if we tell the story his
way: It was to protect his society from a threat he (mistakenly) per-
ceived.200 In addition, the reason why the Canadian Supreme Court ap-
peared sympathetic toward Finta can be linked to its ﬁnding of a
correlation between Nazi hate propaganda as a whole and Finta’s bizarre
beliefs, which in its opinion affected the defendant’s racial thought
processes. Thus the Supreme court appeared to distinguish between a de-
fendant who kills someone and then relies on his racist views to mitigate
his offense (because he has a “reasonable” explanation for his anger) and
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199. See Judith Hippler Bello and Irwin Cotler, International Decisions: Regina v.
Finta, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 473 (1996). 
200. Relevant literature excusing the mistakenly unjustiﬁed actor (i.e., an individual
acting under the mistaken belief that he or she is under attack), includes the following:
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justiﬁcation: Deeds versus Reasons, in Harm
and Culpability 283–84 (Andrew P. Simester & Tony Smith eds., 1996) (“[T]he mistakenly
unjustiﬁed actor is excused.”); see also Greenawalt, supra note 20, at 1908–09 (maintaining
that the mistakenly unjustiﬁed actor is “warranted”); Fletcher, supra note 15, at 564–65. 
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one who through deceit and misrepresentation was led to believe the sit-
uation to be radically different than it was. The latter clearly does not ap-
pear to be as culpable as the former. 
In the Finta case, Justice Cory cited the following factors that sup-
ported the mistake of fact defense:
1. The accused position in a para-military organization;
2. the existence of a war;
3. an imminent invasion by Soviet forces;
4. the general, publicly stated belief in newspapers in Hungary that Jewish
people were subversive and disloyal to the war efforts of Hungary;
5. the universal public expression in the newspapers cited by one of the
witnesses of approval for the deportation of Hungarian Jews;
6. the organizational activity involving the whole Hungarian state together
with their ally, Germany, in the internment and deportation;
7. the open and public manner of the conﬁscation under an ofﬁcial, hier-
archical sanction;
8. The deposit of seized property with the National Treasury or in the
Szeged Synagogue.201
Arguably many of these factors were also present in some form in the
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, and therefore may well have affected
defendants who genuinely believed the situation to be radically different
than it was. In the Tadic´ case, the use of hate propaganda to “engineer”
the commission of international crimes in the former Yugoslavia is evident
in the following statement by Scharf:
The story that emerged from the Tadic´ trial was of a country whose people
were swept into the hurricane of ethnic nationalism. Witness after witness
testiﬁed that there had been general ethnic harmony and a high rate of inter-
faith marriage in Bosnia before the ethnic conﬂict began in 1992. The trial
proved that the hatred that emerged in 1992 had been engineered, not innate.
Serb-controlled television and radio broadcasts spread ethnic hatred like an
epidemic. By way of comparison, one of the witnesses asked the judges to
imagine what would happen if former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke
seized control of all the television and radio stations in the United States. The
lesson of the Tadic´ trial is that given the right set of circumstances, almost any
body in any country can become a “willing executioner.”202
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201. See Regina v. Imre Finta, supra note 137. 
202. See Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 861–82,
865–66 (1997). Of relevance here is the following statement by Janey Greene, A Provocation
NCLR1301_02.qxd   2/15/10  3:51 AM  Page 76
This content downloaded from 144.124.180.191 on Thu, 9 Oct 2014 08:10:54 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
In addition, the factors listed in the Finta judgment draw ICL atten-
tion to the systematic and deliberate campaign of hate propaganda and
incitement by leaders’ vis-à-vis. In the context of Nazi Germany, Baird
observed, “Nazi propaganda was unique in the way it merged the practi-
cal and political with the mythical. Hitler, more than any other twentieth-
century leader, focused on the irrational through myths and symbols in
his propaganda; all the day-by-day themes he employed were subsumed
in the mythical whole, the Hitlerian ethos based on race. The Jewish en-
emy was clearly deﬁned as a group on which the collective fears of the na-
tion must be directed, and thereby purged.”203 Vis-à-vis Nazi Germany,
Gulseth commented on the link between emotions and the effectiveness
of propaganda: 
The propagandist does not engage in genuine argument because his/her an-
swers are determined in advance. . . . For instance, the Nazi propaganda mo-
bilized the Germans by appealing to their emotions rather than their capacity
for rational arguments. Since all the basic motives in human beings are emo-
tionally conditioned, a propagandist makes ample use of love, anger, fear,
hope, guilt, and other feelings and sentiments to manipulate the public.204
Manipulation of emotions via the dissemination of false information
and propaganda is also evident in the context of Rwanda and the former
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Defence for Battered Women Who Kill?, 12 Adel. L. Rev. 146, 148 (1989) (“An alternative
justiﬁcation for the defence of provocation is that certain categories of people are placed
by society in situations in which they well might be provoked to kill. . . . Human weak-
ness cannot be remedied; social problems which encourage social weakness can be. . . .
Society cannot justly insist on giving full weight to its own concerns with preserving
human life and social order when these are counterbalanced by society’s having placed the
defendant at high risk of being provoked to kill. . . .”); See William C. Heffernan, Social
Justice/Criminal Justice, in Heffernan & Kleinig, supra note 181, at 10 (2003) (asking the
following question: “if someone suffers a social wrong (as deﬁned by a speciﬁc conception
of social justice), should that person be excused from liability if his conduct is traceable to
the wrong he suffered?”). 
203. See Jay W. Baird, The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda 1939–1945, 3
(1974). See also, generally, the following: Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans:
Public Mood and Attitude during the Second World War (1977); David Bankier, The
Germans and the Final Solution (1992); Zbynek A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (2nd ed.
1964); Aristotle A. Kallis, Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War (2006). 
204. See Hege Løvdal Gulseth, The Use of Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide: A
Study of Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), 38 (2004).
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Yugoslavia. For instance, Kressel linked propaganda with conformity in
the context of Rwanda: 
Once ﬁred up and misled by inﬂammatory media broadcasts, a frenzied
mob psychology also propelled many Hutus in the general population over
the brink to mass murder. Had these people been asked to act alone, they
might never have become killers. Even hate-poisoned, angry, and misled
people would possibly have felt moral inhibitions against picking up ma-
chetes and using them against unarmed women and children.205
Kressel also saw analogies between the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: 
Extremists in Serbia and Rwanda used the mass media very effectively to ig-
nite and fan the animosities which had historical origins but which had not
ﬂamed up recently. In both instances, the target of the hate propaganda was
a group that had, itself, been associated with mass slaughter in the past.
Thus, Serb leaders were able to obscure the critical distinction between
present-day Croats and Muslims, on the one hand, and Ustashas from the
World War II era on the other. Extremist Hutus drew on the knowledge
that Tutsis in Burundi had murdered tremendous numbers of Hutu in
1972, 1988, and most recently in 1993; they also revived fears that returning
Tutsis would reappropriate Hutu land and restore the Hutu to their histor-
ically subordinate position in Rwandan society. Thus Serb and Hutu mili-
tants created a public atmosphere of fear, where a strategy of mass murder
became widely perceived as the only effective defense against attack.206
In addition, the correlation between hate propaganda and the commis-
sion of international crimes draws attention to cognitive dissonance and
difﬁculties defendants encounter when exposed to misleading information
that contradicts what they already know and are committed to. This leads
to the following question: Why do individuals appear to be more gullible
vis-à-vis lies when told by the state than to the same lies when told by pri-
vate individuals? Arguably one main reason is the increase in state power,
in wartime situations, over individual thought and action at the expense
of community values. In this respect Gopalani observed, “The conven-
tional marketplace of ideas analogy for the justiﬁcation of free speech does
not apply in many cases of genocide. Imperfections in the marketplace,
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205. See Neil J. Kressel, Mass Hate 116 (1996).
206. See ibid., 118. 
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most notably the concentrated power of the mass media, interfere with the
discovery of truth.”207
Furthermore, in support of these statement are results of ﬁeld work un-
dertaken by Malesˇevic´ and Uzelac vis-à-vis the Yugoslav context amongst
students at Zagreb University in May 1992 and June 1993.208 Their research
provides an insight into how the media shaped public opinion in that re-
gion. It should be recalled in this respect that in the context of the
Yugoslav conﬂict, government ofﬁcials in the republics of Serbia and
Croatia were known to have utilized their near-monopoly control of the
news media to fuel their publics’ ethnic prejudices, mobilizing a popular
nationalist constituency to support their rule while discrediting more lib-
eral opponents. In measuring the success of this monopoly on public per-
ceptions of other ethnic groups at that time, Malesˇevic´ and Uzelac
research offers ample evidence of the impact of the media in molding
Croatian public opinion, which had previously been favorable toward the
Muslims. In May 1992, when the ﬁrst sample of their study was taken, the
distance perceived by Croatians between themselves and Muslims was said
to have been the lowest compared with other ex-Yugoslav ethnic groups.
However the second sample, taken in June 1993, revealed a dramatic
change: Muslims now “were classiﬁed in the same manner and in the same
category as Serbs and Montenegrins.” Malesˇevic´ and Uzelac observed that
the change “would not be so striking if the respondents had actually ex-
perienced Muslim misdeeds or atrocities personally.”209 It follows that in
this case, when the entire war was perceived through the media, it could
be concluded that the same media at least partially induced an increase in
social distance. Between May 1992 and June 1993, “Croats from Croatia
read in their daily newspaper about their new enemy—the Muslims.”210 In
sum, the media “thus served as an instrument for the legitimization of the
actions of the Croatian political elite.”211
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207. See Gopalani, supra note 46, at 110.
208. See S. Malesˇevic´ & G. Uzelac, Research Note: Ethnic Distance, Power and War:
The Case of Croatian Students, 3(2) Nations and Nationalism 291–98 (1997). 
209. See ibid. 
210. See ibid. 
211. See ibid. See Otto Lerbinger, Designs for persuasive communication 6 (1972) (the
“new scientiﬁc methods of persuasion” in combination with mass media devices such as
TV and radio have led to the possibility of “hidden persuasion” or “the engineering of con-
sent” among large numbers of people.). 
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In the light of the above, it is clear that individuals appear to be more
gullible vis-à-vis lies told by the state than the same lies told by private in-
dividuals, as a result of the abundance of resources at the disposal of a
state. These resources are employed by the elite in “tracking” their citizens
into participating in a war that beneﬁts mainly a few. This in a sense con-
stitutes a violation of individual autonomy. It is here that one can, for in-
stance, draw some parallels with the concept of entrapment under
domestic law. For instance, under domestic law in the context of cases in-
volving the entrapment defense, the same actions that would merit ac-
quittal if done by the state, provide no defense if done by a private citizen.
One justiﬁcation for this differential treatment, which may be useful in
evaluating state conduct vis-à-vis the ICL context, is that of autonomy. In
this respect, Carlon citing Yaffe, pointed out the following:
[I]n practice, police entrapment is different from private entrapment in
that the former “tracks” the defendant (the analogy is to a heat-seeking mis-
sile “tracking” its target). If a defendant ﬁrst rejects a temptation, the state
will try another, and another, and so forth, until it achieves its results. . . .
At least theoretically, the state will continue to tempt until it achieves its
goal—essentially predetermining that the target will engage in crime, and
giving him no effective choice to do otherwise. A private individual would
never engage in such a lengthy process to convince another to commit a
crime; eventually she would become discouraged and go ﬁnd someone else.
(Indeed, just soliciting someone who clearly does not want to engage in
crime presents tremendous risk.) Professor Yaffe maintains, then, that it is
this aspect—that, objectively, the target does have no choice, since the state
will continue to try different ways to tempt until it ﬁnds the right price—
that allows us to distinguish between police and private entrapment. 212
A second possible explanation for why individuals appear to be more
gullible vis-à-vis lies told by the state than by private individuals is the psy-
chological difference in relying on the words of a state agent, which are
meant to be authoritative, and in relying on those of a private agent,
which do not carry the same weight. Parry gave the following domestic
law examples: “Consider a person who is upstairs in a house when an in-
truder begins to break in below. Grabbing a gun from the nightstand
drawer, he retreats to a back room and calls the police from a cellular
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212. See Andrew Carlon, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State 93 (4) Va. L.
Rev. 1081–34, 1111 (2007).
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phone. The police assure him that he has a right to use his gun to defend
himself from an intruder. Relying on this advice, he shoots the unarmed
intruder at the door of the back room. If the law of that jurisdiction re-
quires an actual threat to life and limb to justify use of deadly force in self-
defense, then he may be in the wrong, but undoubtedly has the right to
present the defense to a jury.”213
From all of the above, it follows that there is a likelihood that in some
instances the defense of mistake, when used in conjunction with provoca-
tion, may be valid, where that mistake led the accused to believe that their
actions were excusable. Thus a charge of murder as a crime against hu-
manity may be negated by genuine mistake of fact that the victim posed a
threat. As unpalatable as such a result may appear, there is a need to focus
on the big picture. Depriving genuine claims of excuse would leave the
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213. See John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake and Ofﬁcial Interpretation of Law, 25 Am.
J. Int’l L., 1–78, n.88 (1997); see also United States v. Barker, 546 F. 2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(The defendants were recruited by a former CIA agent who was at that time working as a
White House employee to participate in a national security operation. Their convictions
were reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeal attempted to carve out an exception to the
mistake of law rule that would enable exoneration of a defendant who relied on authority
that was merely apparent, but not real. The defendants were granted a defense of reasonable
reliance on the advice of a government ofﬁcial.). In the ICL context arguably a form of vi-
carious liability should exist between the superior and the subordinate who obeys an illegal
order based on the right of the former to govern, supervise, manipulate, and control the ac-
tion of the latter. See, e.g., Nico Keijzer, Military Obedience 145 (1978); Matthew Lippman,
Conundrums of Armed Conﬂict: Criminal Offences to Violations of the Humanitarian
Law of War, 15 Dick. J. Int’l. L. 1, 4–5 (1996) (“Low-level combatants were ill-equipped to
evaluate the context of a command. An order might appear invalid but in fact be legally jus-
tiﬁed as an act of reprisal. The extension of criminal culpability would condemn soldiers to
the often conﬂicting commands of domestic and international law.”); James B. Insco,
Defense of Superior Orders before Military Commissions, 13 Duke. J. Comp. & Int’l L.
389–418, 406 (2003) (writing in relation to First Lieutenant William Calley’s defense of obe-
dience to superior orders in relation to his participation in the My Lai Massacre, the court
held that the order on which Calley relied for a defense “is one which a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful.” The pub-
lic outcry in the United States was overwhelming, and on Apr. 1, 1971, one day after the sen-
tence was imposed, President Nixon ordered Calley’s release.). The conviction and release
of Calley illustrate the conﬂict between law and morality in such cases; see Herbert C.
Kelman & Lee H. Lawrence, Assignment of Responsibility in the Case of Lt. Calley, 28(1)
J. Soc. Issues 177–212 (1972) (A national survey conducted between May and June 1971
demonstrated that the majority of Americans opposed not only the verdict and sentence
meted out to Calley, but also the fact that a trial had taken place at all.). 
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international criminal justice system without any tools by which to grade
culpability. As Singer noted, 
Any utilitarian approach to criminal law, however, misses the critical point:
that the engine of the criminal law is to be ignited primarily for imposing
blame, and an actor who honestly believes the facts allow her to act legally,
is not blameworthy, however badly mistaken. For at least three hundred
years the criminal law exonerated those who acted upon mistakes of fact,
reasonable or unreasonable. Neither Hale’s explanation that an act done in
mistake is “morally involuntary” nor Blackstone’s conclusory declaration
that an act done in mistake is done “without a will” is helpful in terms of
explanatory force. Yet each suggests a widely held consensus that people
who act while mistaken are not to be treated equally with those who act
while they are not mistaken, who know precisely what they are doing, and
understand precisely the implications and potential results of their acts.214
Finally, it should be added that provocation should not be employed as
a default mens rea for unreasonable mistake of fact, as mistake of fact even
when unreasonable is given the same status as a reasonable mistake of fact
under some jurisdictions. It follows that, although some domestic juris-
dictions limit the availability of mistake of fact to mistaken belief that was
reasonably held, others such as England allow an unreasonable mistake of
fact defense.215 In relation to the latter, the fact that mere honesty of belief
would support a mistake of fact defense even where it is unreasonable does
not constitute a carte blanche for violent conduct. Thus where the accused
willfully blinded himself to the facts before him, honest belief, in the sense
that that accused had no speciﬁc knowledge to the contrary, would not af-
ford a defense, because in such a situation that accused is ﬁxed by law with
actual knowledge and his belief in another state of facts is irrelevant. 
2. Duress and Coercion: Subjectivity v. Objectivity 
In the corresponding section above (II.C.), it was stressed that a high de-
gree of ambiguity exists in relation to situations involving duress and co-
ercion under international criminal law. As noted previously, the Trial
| N E W C R I M I NAL  LAW R E VI E W | VOL .  13 | NO.  1 | WI NTE R 201082
214. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea II, 28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 513 (1987).
215. In the case of English law, see R v. Letenock (1917) 12 Cr. App. R. 221, CCA; see Law
Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Final Report, 68, para. 3.157 (2004),
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc290(2).pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). For Australia,
which limits the availability of mistake of fact in provocation cases to mistaken belief that
was reasonably held, see R v. Abebe (2000) 1 V.R. 429; R v. Dib (2002) 134 A. Crim. R. 329. 
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Chamber in the Mrdja case, in determining the accused’s duress defense,
included characteristics such as his age and low rank, but omitted “intel-
lectual” and “personal ability” and, more signiﬁcantly, the “constant anti-
Muslim brainwashing and hate propaganda.” This raises the following
fundamental issue: For the purpose of evaluating duress claims, should
war crime defendants be treated as belonging to a category of people
whom the fact ﬁnder might think less able to resist pressure than people
not within that category? 
It is argued here by revisiting the Mrdja deliberations that a more sub-
jective standard should be employed in relation to ICL cases involving
duress. It should be recalled that the defense made reference to the fact that
the accused was a “low-ranking member of the Intervention Platoon” who
was subjected “to the constant anti-Muslim brainwashing and hate pro-
paganda of his superiors.” The defense accordingly submitted that,
“[a]lthough, without any doubt, he had the legal and moral obligation to
oppose the order given to him and the other members of the Platoon,
[Darko Mrdja] had neither the intellectual nor personal ability to do so.”
In support of its submissions, the defencs made reference to the Erdemovic´
Sentencing Judgment and the case law of the German Supreme Court,
which acknowledged that duress is, in some circumstances, a mitigating
factor. However, the prosecution counterargued that the circumstances of
the Erdemovic´ case were different from the present case in that Erdemovic´
expressly refused to comply with his superior’s orders, was threatened with
execution, and only then committed the crimes. 
This brought into focus the role of physical versus nonphysical means
in effectuating duress, and framing the issue as whether duress can em-
anate from psychological as opposed to physical coercion. As already ex-
plained, the Trial Chamber was of the opinion that duress is limited to
physical coercion and that psychological coercion was insufﬁcient to ef-
fectuate duress.216 It therefore refused to subjectify duress with the defen-
dant’s personal characteristics and situational circumstances. It is argued
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216. See, however, research on cognitive restructuring by Keiser & Keiser (1987): “. . .
citing research conducted after World War II and the Korean War, in which it was found
that the techniques of physical coercion create resistance and result in only superﬁcial
changes. Cult conversion by cognitive restructuring, however, does not involve physical co-
ercion but results in deeper and more lasting changes in beliefs and attitudes because the
receiver is brought to cognitive agreement with the worldview being presented”; extracted
from Powers, supra note 125, at 133. 
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herein that greater ﬂexibility is needed in this area since, in practice, the
absence of voluntary participation in the perpetration of atrocities may be
evidenced by the presence of various factors other than force or threats of
force, such as taking advantage of a person who is unable to resist or mis-
representation.217 It follows that duress and coercion should not be inter-
preted narrowly, as is currently the case, as it could encompass most
conduct that negates consent. 
In the light of these considerations, this section calls for a reformula-
tion of the concept of duress in the ICL context along the lines of the U.S.
Model Penal Code (MPC). Under the MPC’s formulation of the defense,
duress is a defense whenever “a person of reasonable ﬁrmness in [the de-
fendant’s] situation would have been unable to resist.”218 In the ofﬁcial
comment to this provision, the American Law Institute explained that
“persons of reasonable ﬁrmness surely break at different points depending
on the stakes that are involved”; it further observed that “even homicide
may sometimes be the product of coercion that is truly irresistible, that
danger to a loved one may have greater impact on a person of reasonable
ﬁrmness than a danger to himself, and, ﬁnally, that long and wasting pres-
sure may break down resistance more effectively than a threat of immedi-
ate destruction.”219 What the MPC essentially achieves is an expansion of
the concept of duress220 “by removing many of its threshold elements and
designating them as mere factors for consideration by the fact-ﬁnder.”221
Of particular signiﬁcance here is the MPC’s stipulation that “long and
wasting pressure may break down resistance more effectively than a threat
of immediate destruction.”222 This is important as it ensures that the de-
fendant in the Mrdja case would be given the same opportunity as the ac-
cused in the Erdemovic´ case to raise the plea of defense of duress by
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217. For a comparative analysis of the concepts of coercion versus persuasion, see
Richard H. Price et al., Principles of Psychology, 510–11 (1982); see also Powers, id., at 125
(“Persuasion and coercion are types of inﬂuence. Persuasion is commonly considered to be
morally justiﬁable, while coercion is considered to be unethical and morally justiﬁed only
in limited types of circumstances.”).
218. Model Penal Code § 209, subd. (1).
219. See Model Penal Code & Commentaries, com. 3 to § 209, p. 376.
220. For a discussion of how the Model Penal Code expands the concepts of duress, see
Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 270–72 (1987).
221. See Dore, supra note 118, at 718–19.
222. See Model Penal Code, supra note 219.
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asserting that he was coerced to perform the act by the continued use of
unlawful force. It follows that even though neither force nor threat of
force was used on a particular occasion, such an accused may argue that
he is responding to earlier psychological conditioning. Thus a defendant
who commits crimes under the shadow of a coercive hate propaganda cam-
paign should be allowed to claim duress. It therefore should be irrelevant
whether the coercion was physical or psychological, or whether it occurred
immediately prior to the act or long before the act. Finally, with a formu-
lation similar to the MPC’s, all of the factors relevant to evaluating Mrdja’s
responsibility—his age, low rank, “intellectual” and “personal ability,” and
the “constant anti-Muslim brainwashing and hate propaganda”—would
form part of the calculus of the defendant’s situation in duress cases. This
however would not necessarily absolve the defendant of blame. 
3. Mental Abnormality (diminished responsibility) and Mental 
Normality (provocation)
Previously it was established that the separation of provocation and di-
minished responsibility has created a gap in coverage into which a worthy
defendant could land, ﬁnding no avail in either of the two defenses under
international criminal law. Also demonstrated was how the accused in
both the Banovic´ and Celebici cases appeared to have fallen into such a
gap. In this section an attempt is made to ﬁll this gap by incorporating ab-
normality into the assessment of normality. To achieve this, the aim here
is not to advocate a wholesale merger of provocation and diminished re-
sponsibility under international criminal law, rather it is to enable a de-
fendant with abnormalities short of diminished responsibility to rely on a
provocation defense. Therefore the two defenses could be pleaded together
by that defendant. 
There is a need to explain why a merger of both defenses has been re-
jected in favor of retaining the two defenses separately.223 The main reason
for rejecting a merger is that it takes us back to square one. In other words,
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223. Interestingly, this issue has provoked lively debate amongst English law scholars. See
Ronald D. Mackay & Barry J. Mitchell, Provoking Diminished Responsibility, Crim. L. Rev.
745 (2003); John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, No Provocation Without Responsibility,
Crim. L. Rev. 219 (2003); James Chalmers, Merging Provocation and Diminished
Responsibility, Crim. L. Rev. 198 (2004). 
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under a merger, all degrees of mental abnormality would be considered
under a provocation defense. This would lead to the importation of prob-
lematic aspects of diminished responsibility such as the admissibility of ex-
pert evidence and a change in the burden of proof in the context of a
provocation defense,224 resulting in much disagreement amongst expert
witnesses and the failure of the provocation defenses in some instances.225
On the other hand, retaining both defenses would ensure that lesser ab-
normalities that do not meet the minimum threshold for diminished re-
sponsibility would be considered in the context of a provocation defense.226
Such an approach would necessitate employing a standard of reasonable-
ness that abandons the objective test in favor of a subjective test that takes
account of the accused’s mental abnormalities in the assessment of his loss
of self-control.227
The Banovic´ case can be employed to demonstrate the effect of includ-
ing mental abnormalities short of diminished responsibility in the assess-
ment of loss of self-control relevant to provocation. Applying subjective
provocation to the defendant in the Banovic´ case, the issue that a fact
ﬁnder would need to resolve would be whether someone with a low level
of education and modest intellectual capabilities is more susceptible to
succumbing to war propaganda and experiencing and emotional outburst.
Of interest is the fact that several studies establishing a correlation be-
tween low literacy level and propensity to succumb to hate propaganda
have already been conducted in the ICL context. For instance, an impor-
tant study by Wood and Stagner228 gives insight into why certain categories
of people respond to propaganda messages. According to their study: 
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224. See generally Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished
Responsibility Defenses, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 827 (1977).
225. See ibid. 
226. See ibid. 
227. This is already the case under English law, where the doctrine of particularization
is recognized. See Reg. v. Dryden [1995] 4 All E.R. 987 (The Court of Appeal said that the
obsessiveness and eccentricity of the defendant should have been left to the jury as “mental
characteristics,” which they should have taken into account as relevant to provocation.).
See R v. Humphreys [1996] Crim. L. Rev. 431 (on immature and attention-seeking per-
sonalities); Reg. v. Thornton No. 2 [1996] 2 All E.R. 1023 (on personality disorders). 
228. See generally Wendy Wood & Brian Stagner, Why Are Some People Easier to
Inﬂuence than Others?, in Persuasion 149–74 (Sharon Shavitt & Timothy C. Brock eds.,
1994).
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. . . persons with high intelligence, are more likely to attend to and com-
prehend the message position but are also less likely to yield to it. The low
level of yielding occurs because intelligent individuals possess knowledge
contradicting the message and can use the information to refute message ar-
guments. . . . In general, then, given a complex, well-reasoned message, the
people who understand the message position should be more likely to
adopt it. The enhanced reception associated with high intelligence should
result in such individuals being more inﬂuenced by a complex message than
those with low intelligence. Alternately, if the message is easy to understand
and not well reasoned, yielding becomes the crucial factor, and less intelli-
gent recipients should be more readily persuaded.229
This observation is in line with the results of Hovland, Lumsdaine, and
Shefﬁeld’s study, which demonstrated that better-educated men were
more likely than those less educated to be persuaded by convincing, high-
quality arguments such as “Appeasement of Germany by Britain and
France would only make things worse in the long run.” Better-educated
men were less persuaded by silly arguments such as “The Germans, if vic-
torious, would try to control our country completely and force Americans
to work as slaves.”230 Furthermore, in Rwanda, Gulseth observed, “The
less educated and informed the people to whom agitation propaganda is
addressed, the easier it is to make. Therefore it is particularly suited in
Africa. . . . In 1994, the school attendance rate in the country [Rwanda]
was only 36.4%.”231 In addition, of relevance to understanding why so
many Hutus participated in the genocide is the following historical ac-
count of the comparative educational levels of Hutus and Tutsis by
Gulseth: “Under Belgian rule, education became a portal which gave ac-
cess to political power. It was also the portal of the Catholic Church.
Political conﬂict in Belgium, and lack of money and men in Rwanda, left
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230. See, generally, Experiments on Mass Communications (Carl I. Hovland, Arthur
A. Lumsdaine, & Fred D. Shefﬁeld eds., 1949).
231. See Gulseth, supra note 204, at 33–34 (2004). From a legal perspective, see Toni
Pickard & Phil Goldman, Dimensions of Criminal Law, 467 (1992) (“Human frailties en-
compass personal characteristics habitually affecting an accused’s awareness of the circum-
stances which create risk. Such characteristics must be relevant to the ability to perceive the
risk. For example . . . illiteracy may excuse the failure to take care with a hazardous sub-
stance identiﬁable only by a label, as the accused may be unable, in this case, to apprehend
the relevant facts. . . .”).
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the educational system almost entirely in missionary hands. Most often,
they restricted admission mainly to the Tutsi, especially in the upper
schools. Since the Tusti were the “natural born chiefs,” they had to be
given priority in education so that the Church could enhance its control
over the future elite of the country. In schools where both Hutu and Tutsi
children were admitted, the latter group was given a ‘superior’ education
taught in French.”232
Finally, the above discussion highlights the need for redrawing the
boundaries between the notions of normality and abnormality in the ICL
context. In relation to the Banovic´ case, it would be stretching the truth
to say that the accused was abnormal since such characteristics as low level
of education and modest intellectual capabilities are part of ordinary
human weaknesses. The case therefore should have been dealt with under
provocation. On the other hand, Landzo’s personality characteristics
should have constituted a dual disability that should have been examined
in relation not only to diminished responsibility but also to the provoca-
tion defense. 
CONCLUS ION
The ICL ﬁeld is currently facing a problem that criminal law has grappled
with for hundreds of years—the imposition of blame. As evidenced by the
herein, attributing blame in relation to some of the most serious crimes
known to humankind is a complex process. Whereas international crimes
are indeed extraordinary in their level of heinousness, the men and women
who commit them are very much ordinary. This contradiction necessitates
a fact-ﬁnding process that evaluates the criminal responsibility of perpetra-
tors in the light of all the circumstances. The point of this discussion was
precisely to illuminate the circumstances of men and women who kill and
restore some humanity into this category of criminals. At present, one has
the impression that there is a policy of judicial stripping away a war crime
defendant’s situational context from the judgments of the international
criminal tribunals. The weeding out of normatively deviant elements by
ICL judges leaves the international criminal event with a very meager plot
line, thereby augmenting the defendant’s apparent deviance: the war crime
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defendant, using a weapon on an unarmed civilian, intentionally ﬁred mul-
tiple shots. Devoid of the inﬂammatory media broadcasts that may have
turned many like the defendant against individuals belonging to another
group, and devoid of historical animosities between the defendant’s group
and the deceased’s group, which would not have ﬂamed up but for hate
propaganda, the defendant’s act of killing seems opportunistic, manifesting
the violent, dangerous character of an evil and racist person. This is, how-
ever, far from being the case: hate propaganda overshadowed the extermi-
nation of Jewish people, the massacres of Tutsis, and the ethnic cleansing
of Muslims, and therefore should be very much a part and parcel of the as-
sessment of the criminal responsibility of the accused. 
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